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ALLOWING STATES TO HELP WORKERS SAVE 
FOR RETIREMENT: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S 
PROPOSED RULEMAKING THAT PROVIDES A 
SAFE HARBOR FOR STATE SAVINGS 
PROGRAMS UNDER ERISA 
 
William A. Nelson* 
 
There is a “retirement crisis” in America.  Contributing to 
this crisis is the fact that millions of Americans do not have  
access to a retirement savings plan through their employers.  
States, concerned with the economic stability of their citizens, 
have created laws that require private sector employers to  
implement state-administered payroll deduction IRA programs 
in their workplaces.  Even though many states are currently  
debating whether to adopt state payroll deduction programs, 
this Article will focus on Oregon, Illinois, and California, which 
have enacted laws along those lines.   
One obstruction to wider adoption of such state measures 
has been uncertainty about the effect of the Employee  
Retirement Income Security Act’s (ERISA) broad preemption of 
state laws that “relate to” private sector employee benefit plans 
and its prohibition on requiring employers to offer ERISA plans.  
To remedy this problem, the Department of Labor (DOL) has  
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which 
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would make it clear that state payroll deduction savings  
programs with automatic enrollment conforming to the safe  
harbor in this proposal do not establish ERISA plans. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is a “retirement crisis” in America.1  Even though 
some would view this as a hyperbole, empirical evidence reflects 
that “[t]he average working household has virtually no  
retirement savings”2 and that “[t]he collective retirement  
savings gap among working households age 25-64 ranges from 
$6.8 to $14 trillion.”3  Contributing to this crisis is the fact that 
millions of Americans do not have access to a retirement savings 
plan through their employers.4  This problem is more prevalent 
in the small business community; more than three quarters of 
small business employers do not offer a retirement plan to their 
employees.5  Research reflects that an important predictor for 
retirement readiness is participation in an employee benefit 
plan, as employees save more in a workplace plan than they 
would on their own.6  For example, even though there are a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nari Rhee, The Retirement Savings Crisis: Is It Worse Than We Think?, NAT’L 
INST. ON RETIREMENT SECURITY 20 (June 2013), www.nirsonline.org/storage 
/nirs/documents/Retirement%20Savings%20Crisis/retirementsavingscrisis_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5PRP-S5LZ]. 
2 Id. at 1 (“When all households are included—not just households with  
retirement accounts—the median retirement account balance is $3,000 for all  
working-age households and $12,000 for near-retirement households.  Two-thirds of 
working households age 55-64 with at least one earner have retirement savings less 
than one times their annual income, which is far below what they will need to  
maintain their standard of living in retirement.”). 
3 Id.  
4 Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic 
Differences and Trends, 2013, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., NO. 405 1, 6  
(Oct. 2014), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_405_Oct14.RetPart.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XYF9-5RJ6].  A January 2016 Pew Report found that 42% of full-
time workers and 67% of part-time workers do not have access to an employee  
benefit plan at work.  Who’s In, Who’s Out, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 
2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/01/retirement_savings_report_ 
jan16. pdf [https://perma.cc/NN3S-DDAH] [hereinafter Who’s In, Who’s Out].     
5 Retirement Security Challenges and Prospects for Employees of Small  
Businesses, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 1 (Jul. 16, 2013), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655889.pdf [https://perma.cc/44BW-4M97]. 
6 Jack VanDerhei, What Causes EBRI Retirement Readiness Ratings™ to Vary: 
Results from the 2014 Retirement Security Projection Model®, EMP.  
BENEFIT RES. INST., NO. 396 1, 18 (Feb. 2014), 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_396_Feb14.RRRs2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
FJ5L-GYX3].    
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number of non-employer based retirement savings options, such 
as IRAs, few workers actually utilize them.7     
States, concerned with their citizens’ economic stability, 
have created laws that require private sector employers to  
implement state-administered payroll deduction savings  
programs in their workplaces.  Even though many states are  
currently debating whether to adopt the programs, this Article 
will focus on California, Illinois, and Oregon, all of which have 
enacted laws creating payroll deduction savings programs.8   
One obstruction to a wider adoption of such measures at the 
state level has been uncertainty of the effect of the Employee  
Retirement Income Security Act’s (ERISA) “broad preemption of 
state laws that ‘relate to’ private sector employee benefit plans[,] 
and [ERISA’s] prohibition on requiring employers to offer  
[employee benefit] plans.”9  To remedy this problem, the  
Department of Labor (DOL) has published a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) that would clarify “that state payroll  
deduction savings programs with automatic enrollment that  
conform to the safe harbor in th[e] proposal do not establish 
ERISA plans.”10   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 David C. John & William G. Gale, Structuring State Retirement Saving Plans: 
A Guide to Policy Design and Management Issues 1, 2 (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/structuring-state-retirement-
saving-plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/B39H-BYTH]. 
8 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, Pub. L. No. 98-1150, 2014 Ill. 
Legis. Serv. 6092, 6094 (2016); California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust 
Act, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6007-08 (2016); Oregon Retirement Savings Board, 2015 
Or. Legis. Serv. Ch. 557 (2016).  Even though this Article focuses on states that have 
passed auto-IRA laws, it is important to note that more than half of the states have 
introduced laws that would provide some type of state-based retirement program.  
How States are Working to Address the Retirement Savings Challenge An Analysis of 
State-Sponsored Initiatives to Help Private Sector Workers Save, THE PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS 1, 3 (Jun. 2016), www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets 
/2016/06/howstatesareworkingtoaddresstheretirementsavingschallenge.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A64V-BVML] [hereinafter Retirement Savings Challenge].     
9 State Savings Programs for Non-Government Employees, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. 1 
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-
activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/state-savings-programs-for-non-government-
employees.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2RJ-2SAE]. 
10 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,006 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
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This Article begins by discussing the current statute  
concerning ERISA’s preemption of state laws that “relate to”  
private sector employee benefit plans, and provides a discussion 
of the DOL’s proposed rulemaking that provides a safe harbor 
for state payroll deduction savings programs.  The Article then  
transitions into an examination of the current state-based  
initiatives, analyzes specific state legislative proposals under the 
requirements of the proposed rulemaking, and proposes what, if 
any, changes need to be made to the state payroll deduction  
savings programs to ensure that the programs will not run afoul 
of ERISA.  The Article concludes by analyzing policy concerns  
regarding state payroll deduction savings programs, provides 
comment on the DOL proposed rulemaking, and provides  
additional elements of a model state payroll deduction savings 
program.   
II.  EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT 
PREEMPTION – CURRENT LAW 
A.    Statutory Language 
The stated policy of ERISA is to  
protect interstate commerce and the interests of  
participants in employee benefit plans and their 
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and  
reporting to participants and beneficiaries of  
financial and other information with respect  
thereto, by establishing standards of conduct,  
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of  
employee benefit plans, and by providing for  
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access 
to the Federal courts.11   
ERISA applies to employee benefit plans that are “established or 
maintained—(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012).  
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industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee 
organization or organizations representing employees engaged 
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; 
or (3) by both.”12   
To assure uniformity of the laws governing employee benefit 
plans, Congress placed their regulation under federal  
jurisdiction.  Section 514 of ERISA states that the Act  
“supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in . . . [29 
USCS §] 1003(a) . . . and not exempt under . . . [29 USCS §] 
1003(b).”13  “The term ‘State’ includes a State, any political  
subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, 
which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and 
conditions of employee benefit plans.”14  “‘State law[s] include[] 
all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action  
having the effect of law, of any State.”15   
While broadly applied, ERISA preemption provisions allow 
for a number of exceptions.16  The preemption provisions  
generally do not apply to state criminal law.17  The preemption 
provisions also do not apply to any state law that “regulates  
insurance, banking, or securities”18 or “plans established solely 
to meet state workers’ compensation, unemployment  
compensation, or disability insurance laws.”19  ERISA as a whole 
does not apply to a “governmental plan,” which is defined as “a 
plan established or maintained for its employees by the  
Government of the United States, by the government of any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Id. at § 1003(a).  
13 Id. at § 1144(a).  
14 Id. at § 1144(c)(2).  
15 Id. at § 1144(c)(1).  
16 Jeffrey Lewis & Mary Ellen Signorille, ERISA Preemption, AM.  
BAR ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-aba-annual/papers/2000 
/signorille.pdf [https://perma.cc/T98L-96EZ]. 
17 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4). 
18 Id. at § 1144(b)(2)(A); ERISA Preemption Primer, 1, 
http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/files/ERISA_Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/53EN-
LX9K] [hereinafter ERISA Primer]. 
19 ERISA Primer, supra note 18, at 1. 
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State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or  
instrumentality of any of the foregoing.”20 
While it is important to note these exceptions exist, each 
state law discussed would not be exempt from ERISA  
preemption under the current statutory language.  Even though 
the state sponsors the plans, the statutory language will cover 
private-sector employees, and not public employees.21  Because 
the preemption provision only covers plans established for  
governmental employees, the exemption does not apply.22   
Therefore, each state law (California, Illinois, and Oregon) must 
rely on the DOL’s proposed safe harbor for state savings  
programs to avoid being preempted by ERISA. 
B.    Judicial Interpretation  
ERISA’s preemption language under the statute is  
relatively clear and straightforward:  “ERISA preempts any 
state law[s] that relate[] to . . . ‘employee benefit plan[s].’”23  
However, “[b]ecause ERISA policy is developed through court  
interpretations of federal law, it is complex and leaves many  
unanswered questions[,]” most importantly the scope of laws 
that “relate to” employee benefit plans.24  Since ERISA’s  
enactment, courts have been asked to opine on the scope of the 
preemption provisions; “[w]hile the Supreme Court is ultimately 
responsible to interpret federal law, it has decided relatively few 
ERISA cases[.]”25     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32).  
21 David E. Morse, State Initiatives to Expand the Availability and Effectiveness 
of Private Sector Retirement Plans How Federal Laws Apply to Plan Design Options, 
GEORGETOWN U. MCCOURT SCHOOL OF PUB. POL’Y CTR. FOR RETIREMENT INITIATIVES 
1, 2-3 (Dec. 2014), http://cri.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Morse_ 
CRIPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8P2-LACT]. 
22 Id. at 3.  It is important to note that there are ERISA academics who believe 
that automatic enrollment would not trigger ERISA preemption, but the Article  
relies on the DOL’s opinion that a separate safe harbor is necessary for automatic 
payroll deduction savings programs.  See id. at 7. 
23 Id. at 3. 
24 ERISA Primer, supra note 18, at 1. 
25 Id. at 3. 
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“State policymakers face ERISA [preemption] issues [when] 
they consider proposals to expand access to health care, regulate 
. . . health insurers, prescribe appeal rights of health plan  
enrollees, and monitor health care costs and quality.”26  ERISA 
preemption concerns also arise in the context of worker’s  
compensation laws, disability benefits claims, and employee  
compensation claims.27  Historically, courts have interpreted 
ERISA’s preemption provision broadly with respect to employee 
benefit plans in order to conform to Congress’ intent to promote 
uniform administration of those plans.28   
1.    State Laws that “Relate To” Employee Benefit Plans 
Courts look at a number of factors when considering  
whether a state law “relates to” ERISA.  Factors include whether 
the state law: refers to an employee benefit plan, mandates how 
employee benefit plans are designed or administered, is a law of 
general applicability, or has a direct economic impact on  
employee benefit plans.29  The factors also include whether an 
employee benefit plan is essential to the state law’s operation.30  
In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,31 a group of retired 
employees sued their employer, challenging a provision in their 
employer’s pension plan that offset retirees’ pension benefits “by 
an amount equal to [a] workers’ compensation award[] for which 
the [retiree was] eligible.”32  The retirees argued that the New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Id. at 1. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 2. 
29 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (stating that a state law  
relates to a plan “if it has connection with or reference to such a plan”); United Food 
& Commercial Workers v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1986) (determining 
whether the state law impacts the structure of ERISA plans); Fort Halifax Packing 
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (determining whether the state law impacts the 
administration of ERISA plans); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 147 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (determining whether state law has an economic impact on ERISA plans). 
30 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards. Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 
325 (1997) (determining whether “the existence of ERISA plans is essential”). 
31 451 U.S. 504 (1981).  
32 Id. at 507. 
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Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act prohibited such offsets.33  
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey held that 
“the pension offset provisions [in the employers’ pension plans] 
were invalid under New Jersey law, and concluded that  
Congress had not intended [the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974] to pre-empt [such a] state law[].”34  The 
Third Circuit subsequently reversed the District Court’s  
decision, holding that “the New Jersey statute forbidding offsets 
of pension benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation 
awards could not withstand ERISA’s general pre-emption  
provision[.]”35  On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit.36    
The Supreme Court opined that to resolve the retirees’ 
claims, it must determine whether ERISA preempted the  
provision in the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act by  
analyzing whether it was a state law “‘that relate[s] to any  
employee benefit plan.’”37  The Court first found that, as a  
general matter, “[p]re-emption of state law by federal statute or  
regulation is not favored ‘in the absence of persuasive reasons—
either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no 
other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so  
ordained.’”38   
The Court looked at the plain language of ERISA, which 
states that “the provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede 
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter  
relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Id. at 521 (quoting N. J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29 (West 1980) (“[T]he right of 
compensation granted by [the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act] may be set 
off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against 
employees' retirement pension benefits or payments.”)).   
34 Id. at 508. 
35 Id. at 509 (citing Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238, 1250-51 
(3d Cir. 1980)). 
36 Id.  
37 Alessi, 451 U.S. at 522-23 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). 
38 Id. at 522 (quoting Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 
311, 317 (1981)). 
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of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.”39  
The Court also noted Congress’ declaration of policy, where it 
made clear that “ERISA is a ‘comprehensive and reticulated 
statute,’ which Congress adopted after careful study of private 
retirement pension plans.”40  
The Court found that the contested provision of the New  
Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act was preempted because “it  
‘relate[s] to pension plans’ governed by ERISA.”41  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Marshall opined that  
[w]hatever the purpose or purposes of the New  
Jersey statute, we conclude that it “relate[s] to  
pension plans” governed by ERISA because it  
eliminates one method for calculating pension  
benefits—integration—that is permitted by federal 
law.  ERISA permits integration of pension funds 
with other public income maintenance moneys for 
the purpose of calculating benefits, and the IRS  
interpretation approves integration with the exact 
funds addressed by the New Jersey workers’  
compensation law.  New Jersey’s effort to ban  
pension benefit offsets based on workers’  
compensation applies directly to this calculation 
technique.42   
The Court also held that even though the New Jersey law 
only affects employee benefit plans indirectly through a workers’ 
compensation law, ERISA establishes “that even indirect state  
action bearing on [employee benefit plans] may encroach upon 
the area of exclusive federal concern.”43               
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).  
40 Id. at 510 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 
359, 361-62 (1980)). 
41 Id. at 524. 
42 Id. at 507, 524-25. 
43 Alessi, 451 U.S. at 525. 
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In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,44 Delta and other airlines  
“provided their employees with various medical and disability 
benefits through welfare plans subject to ERISA.”45  The plans, 
which were in place “prior to the effective date of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, did not provide benefits to employees  
disabled by pregnancy as required by the New York Human 
Rights Laws and . . . Disability Benefits Laws.”46  The airlines 
“brought three separate federal declaratory judgment actions 
against . . . state agencies and officials, alleging that” ERISA 
preempted both the Human Rights and Disability Benefits 
Laws.47   
The Southern District Court of New York “held that the  
Human Rights Law was pre-empted, . . . as it required the  
provision of pregnancy benefits prior to the effective date of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act[;] . . . [b]ecause . . . the Airlines 
would have provided pregnancy benefits solely to comply with 
the Disability Benefits Law, the court dismissed the portion of 
their complaint seeking relief from that law.”48  “[T]he Second 
Circuit affirmed [the lower court’s holding] as to the Human 
Rights Law[,]” but remanded the Disability Benefits Law claim 
to resolve “whether the Airlines provided disability benefits 
through plans constituting separate administrative units, in 
which event the Disability Benefits Law would be enforceable, or 
through portions of comprehensive benefit plans, in which case 
ERISA regulation would be exclusive.”49  On certiorari, the  
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the  
Second Circuit with respect to the Human Rights Law provision, 
holding that it was preempted by ERISA insofar as the state law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 463 U.S. 85 (1983).  
45 Id. at 92. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 92-93 n. 9 (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 485 F. Supp. 300, 
311 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
49 Id. at 93, 95 (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287, 1291, 
1307-08 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
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prohibited practices that were lawful under ERISA;50 however, 
the Court reversed the decision that the portions of one  
employer’s multi-benefit plan, which were maintained to comply 
with the Disability Benefits Law, were exempt from ERISA 
preemption.51 
The Supreme Court found that “the Human Rights Law and 
the Disability Benefits Law ‘relate to’ employee benefit plans.”52  
The Court reasoned that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit 
plan . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”53  
Using this description, the Court found that “the Human Rights 
Law, which prohibits employers from structuring their employee 
benefit plans in a manner that discriminates on the basis of  
pregnancy, and the Disability Benefits Law, which requires  
employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly ‘relate to’ 
benefit plans.”54  Courts must “give effect to this plain language 
unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the  
language to have some more restrictive meaning.”55  To support 
its conclusion, the Court cited legislative history illustrating the 
expansive “breadth of [ERISA] preemption,”56 and held that “[b]y 
establishing benefit plan regulation ‘as exclusively a federal  
concern,’ . . . Congress minimized the need for interstate  
employers to administer their plans differently in each State in 
which they have employees.”57  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108-09. 
51 Id. at 109-10. 
52 Id. at 96. 
53 Id. at 96-97. 
54 Id. at 97. 
55 Id.  
56 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99 (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974))  
(It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the 
bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference  
substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, 
thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and  
local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended 
to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local  
governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or 
effect of law.). 
57 Id. at 105 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 
(1981)). 
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In Shaw, the Supreme Court established that companies  
cannot “circumvent the [New York] Disability Benefits Law by 
adopting plans . . . combin[ing] disability benefits inferior to 
those required by that law with other types of benefits” and  
unintended by Congress, while simultaneously preserving “the 
role of state disability laws[] to make enforcement of those laws 
impossible.”58  The Court held that  
while the State may not require an employer to  
alter its ERISA plan, it may force the employer to 
choose between providing disability benefits in a 
separately administered plan and including the 
state-mandated benefits in its ERISA plan. If the 
State is not satisfied that the ERISA plan comports 
with the requirements of its disability insurance 
law, it may compel the employer to maintain a  
separate plan that does comply.59   
In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,60 “employees filed suit 
. . . seeking severance pay pursuant to [a Maine statute].”61  The 
employer argued that the Maine statute was preempted by 
ERISA.62  The Maine Superior Court ruled that the employees 
were entitled to severance pay and that ERISA did not preempt 
the provision because the employer’s severance pay liability 
arose from the statute rather than the operation of the employee 
benefit plan.63  Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Id. at 108. 
59 Id. 
60 482 U.S. 1 (1987).  
61 Id. at 5 (citing  ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 625-B(2) (2015)  
(“Any employer who relocates or terminates a covered  
establishment shall be liable to his employees for severance pay at 
the rate of one week's pay for each year of employment by the  
employee in that establishment.  The severance pay to eligible  
employees shall be in addition to any final wage payment to the 
employee and shall be paid within one regular pay period after the 
employee's last full day of work, notwithstanding any other  
provisions of law.”). 
62 Id. at 7. 
63 Id. at 6 (citing Dir. of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Fort Halifax Packing Co., 
Civ. Action No. CV81-516, at 3, 7 (Me. Oct. 29, 1982)). 
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that the severance pay statute was not preempted by ERISA  
because the statute “pre-empted only benefit plans created by 
employers or employee organizations.”64  On certiorari, the  
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Maine Supreme  
Judicial Court’s decision, holding “that the Maine statute is not 
pre-empted by ERISA, not for the reason offered by the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court, but because the statute neither  
establishes, nor requires an employer to maintain, an employee 
welfare benefit ‘plan’ under that federal statute.”65  
The Supreme Court, analyzing the plain language of the  
statute, found that “ERISA’s pre-emption provision d[id] not  
refer to state laws relating to ‘employee benefits,’ but to state 
laws relating to ‘employee benefit plans.’”66  The Court then 
found “that pre-emption of the Maine statute would not further 
the purpose of ERISA pre-emption.”67  Relying on legislative  
history, the Court opined that  
[t]he purposes of ERISA’s pre-emption provision 
make clear that the Maine statute in no way raises 
the types of concerns that prompted pre-emption. 
Congress intended pre-emption to afford employers 
the advantages of a uniform set of administrative 
procedures governed by a single set of regulations. 
This concern only arises, however, with respect to 
benefits whose provision by nature requires an  
ongoing administrative program to meet the  
employer's obligation. It is for this reason that  
Congress pre-empted state laws relating to plans, 
rather than simply to benefits.68     
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Id. (citing Dir. of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Ft. Halifax Packing Co., 510 
A.2d 1054, 1056, 1059, 1064 (Me. 1986)). 
65 Id. at 6-7. 
66 Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 7 (emphasis in original).  
67 Id. at 8. 
68 Id. at 11. 
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  In Ingersoll-Rand Co., v. McClendon,69 an employee sued 
his employer for wrongful termination.70  The company stated it 
fired the employee as part of “a companywide reduction in 
force[;]” however, the employee alleged “that his pension would 
have vested in another four months and [the main] reason for 
his termination was the company’s desire to avoid making  
contributions to his pension fund.”71  The District Court granted 
the employer’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which was  
affirmed by the Texas Court of Appeals “holding that [the  
plaintiff’s] employment was terminable at will.”72  “The Texas  
Supreme Court reversed and remanded,” finding that the  
“passage of ERISA demonstrate[d] the great significance  
attached to income security for retirement purposes . . . [and] 
that under Texas law a plaintiff could recover in a wrongful  
discharge action if he established that ‘the principal reason for 
his termination was the employer’s desire to avoid contributing 
to or paying benefits under the employee’s pension fund.’”73  On 
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that “a claim 
that the employer wrongfully terminated plaintiff primarily  
because of the employer’s desire to avoid contributing to, or  
paying benefits under, the employee’s pension fund—‘relate[s] to’ 
an ERISA-covered plan within the meaning of [Section] 514(a), 
and is therefore pre-empted.”74 
The Supreme Court cited the language of ERISA’s  
“pre-emption clause [a]s conspicuous for its breadth.”75  The 
Court opined that “a state law may ‘relate to’ a benefit plan, and 
thereby be pre-empted, even if . . . a state law is consistent with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 498 U.S. 133 (1990).  
70 Id. at 135. 
71 Id. at 135-36. 
72 Id. at 136 (citing McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex. 
App. 1988)). 
73 Id. (quoting McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71)). 
74 Id. at 133, 140. 
75 Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 138 (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 
52, 58 (1990). 
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ERISA’s substantive requirements.”76  The Court, distinguishing 
from its precedent where the ERISA preemption clause was 
found to be limited, found that they were  
not dealing here with a generally applicable statute 
that makes no reference to, or indeed functions  
irrespective of, the existence of an ERISA plan. Nor 
is the cost of defending this lawsuit a mere  
administrative burden. Here, the existence of a  
pension plan is a critical factor in establishing  
liability under the State’s wrongful discharge law. 
As a result, this cause of action relates not merely 
to pension benefits, but to the essence of the pen-
sion plan itself.77 
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,78 a commercial insurer sought 
relief from “a New York statute requir[ing] hospitals to collect  
surcharges from patients covered by a commercial insurer . . . 
and . . . subject[ing] certain health maintenance organizations 
(HMO’s) to surcharges that vary with the number of Medicaid  
recipients each enrolls.”79  The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York granted the insurers’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment,80 and the Second Circuit affirmed,  
holding that the surcharge provisions, which required hospitals 
to collect surcharges from patients covered by plaintiffs but not 
from patients insured by the plan, were preempted by ERISA 
because the surcharges imposed “‘a significant economic burden 
on . . . insurers’ . . . and therefore ‘ha[d] an impermissible impact 
on ERISA plan structure and administration.’”81  On certiorari, 
the Supreme Court reversed and held “that the provisions for  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Id. at 139 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)). 
77 Id. at 139-40 (emphasis in original).  
78 514 U.S. 645 (1995).  
79 Id. at 645. 
80 Id. at 652 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993)). 
81 Id. at 653-54 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 711, 721, 725 
(2d Cir. 1993)). 
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surcharges do not ‘relate to’ employee benefit plans within the 
meaning of ERISA’s pre-emption provision[.]”82   
    The Supreme Court found that “under the applicable 
‘“broad common-sense meaning,” a state law may “relate to” a 
benefit plan, and thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is not 
specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only  
indirect[;]’”83 however, the Court also stated that “‘[p]re-emption 
does not occur . . . if the state law has only a tenuous, remote, or 
peripheral connection with covered plans, as is the case with 
many laws of general applicability.’”84  The Supreme Court 
opined that the New York laws were not preempted by ERISA 
because the surcharge provisions neither referenced ERISA 
plans in any manner, nor bore “the requisite ‘connection with’ 
ERISA plans to trigger pre-emption.”85  Also, in relying on  
Legislative history, the Court found that Congress did not intend 
“to displace general health care regulation.”86         
2.    Takeaways 
It is important to analyze the takeaways from the history of 
ERISA Supreme Court jurisprudence.  As previously noted,  
because ERISA policy is developed through judicial  
interpretations of federal law, these takeaways can inform the 
public on how courts are likely to view whether state payroll  
deduction savings programs are preempted, as well as the scope 
of that preemption.     
The first takeaway is that the Supreme Court, looking at 
the Supremacy Clause,87 will begin its analysis by focusing on  
congressional intent, specifically on whether Congress intended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Id. at 645, 649. 
83 Id. at 653 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 139). 
84 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers  
Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 514 U.S. 645 , 661 (1995) (quoting D.C. v. Great Washington 
Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n. 1 (1992)). 
85 Id. at 656, 662. 
86 Id. at 661. 
87 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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a federal law to preempt a state law.88  Historically, by relying 
on congressional intent, the Court has viewed ERISA as a  
comprehensive, broad statute that “Congress enacted . . . to  
establish uniform federal standards to protect private employee 
pension plans from fraud and mismanagement.”89  However, as 
previously noted, even with its breadth, ERISA preemption is  
subject to a number of exemptions.90     
The second takeaway is that state laws are only preempted 
by ERISA as far as they “relate to” plans, rather than simply  
relating to benefits provided by those plans.91  Even though the 
“relate to” language has been “construed expansively,” generally, 
only laws that establish or require employers to maintain an  
employee benefit plan will be subject to ERISA preemption.92 
The third takeaway is that state laws do not have to directly 
affect employee benefit plans.  The Supreme Court has ruled 
that it is enough for the state law to indirectly affect  
employer-sponsored health plans by imposing substantial costs 
on plans.93  This is an important takeaway because there are 
many laws that do not directly affect employee benefit plans, but 
may still run afoul of ERISA preemption provisions.94      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 89 (1824).  The Supremacy Clause  
invalidates state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress.”  
Id. 
89 ERISA Primer, supra note 18, at 1. 
90 Id. at 3; See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 
1144 (2012). 
91 ERISA Primer, supra note 18, at 2. 
92 Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangements under the Employee Retirement  
Income Security Act (ERISA): A Guide to Federal and State Regulation,  
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN. 1, 17, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/enforcement/ 
healthcare-fraud/mewa-under-erisa-a-guide-to-federal-and-state-regulation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CS7K-75SJ]; Kelsey N. H. Mayo & Eugene S. Griggs, Offering  
Benefits to Employees – When Benefits are Subject to ERISA & What that Means, 
(Feb. 12, 2010), www.poynerspruill.com/publications/Offering-Benefits-to-Employees-
%7c2D-When-Benefits-are-Subject-to-ERISA-%7c26-What-that-Means 
[https://perma.cc/H8LD-LMHE]. 
93 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers  
Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995). 
94 ERISA Primer, supra note 18, at 1. 
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III.  DEPARTMENT OF LABOR GUIDANCE  
While the state retirement initiatives are laudable and 
would provide millions of Americans access to a retirement  
savings vehicle, the initiatives do not meet the current safe  
harbor for payroll deduction IRAs and would be preempted by 
ERISA.95  The state laws would not meet the current safe harbor 
because each of the state laws require employee participation in 
the program (automatic enrollment), rather than allowing  
employees to voluntarily participate in the program. 96      
“The 1975 regulation [implementing ERISA] provides that 
ERISA does not cover a payroll deduction IRA arrangement so 
long as four [requirements] are met:”97  
(i) [n]o contributions are made by the employer or 
employee association; (ii) [p]articipation is  
completely voluntary for employees or members; 
(iii) [t]he sole involvement of the employer or  
employee organization . . . without endors[ing] [the 
program,] to permit the sponsor to publicize the  
program to employees or members, to collect  
contributions through payroll deductions or dues 
checkoffs and to remit them to the sponsor; and (iv) 
[t]he employer or employee organization receives no 
consideration in the form of cash or otherwise,  
other than reasonable compensation for  
[administrative] services actually rendered in  
connection with payroll deductions or dues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Letter from Randel Johnson, Senior Vice President, Labor Immigration & 
Emp. Benefits, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Aliya Wong, Exec. Dir., Ret. Pol’y, 
Lab., Immigration & Emp. Benefits, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Dep’t of Lab., 
Office of Regulations and Interpretations, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin. (Jan. 19, 2016), 
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EBSA-2015-0018-0057& 
attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8YQA-2ZZ8] [hereinafter Johnson & Wong Letter]. 
96 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,008 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
97 Id. 
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checkoffs.98   
The courts have held that employee participation is  
“completely voluntary” if the employee’s enrollment is  
self-initiated;99 courts have found that an opt-out arrangement is 
not consistent with the requirement for a “completely voluntary”  
arrangement.100  However, the DOL believes that the 1975 safe 
harbor was not written with the current situation in mind—
when a state government, rather than an employer, sets terms 
and administers the payroll deduction savings arrangement.101  
Therefore, with this belief, and a Presidential directive, the DOL 
has proposed a new safe harbor permitting automatic enrollment 
in state payroll deduction savings arrangements.102  
A.    Proposed Rulemaking: Safe Harbor for Savings 
Arrangements Established by States for Non-
Governmental Employees 
 The DOL has published a proposed rulemaking that 
“set[s] forth a safe harbor describing circumstances in which a 
payroll deduction savings program, including one with automatic  
enrollment, would not give rise to an employee pension benefit 
plan under ERISA.”103  The proposed rulemaking states that  
the terms “employee pension benefit plan” and  
“pension plan” shall not include an individual  
retirement plan . . . established and maintained  
pursuant to a State payroll deduction savings  
program, provided that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 29 C.F.R § 2510.3-2 (2015) (emphasis added). 
99 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,008. 
100 See, e.g., Int’l Res., Inc. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that regulatory exception did not apply partly because “coverage was  
automatic and applied to all employees”); Kanne v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 
F.2d, 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1988) (contrasting “voluntary” participation with “automatic” 
participation). 
101 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,008. 
102 Final Report: White House Conference on Aging, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. 1 (July 
13, 2015), https://whitehouseconferenceonaging.gov/2015-WHCOA-Final-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MY66-DAUH]. 
103 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,006. 
NELSONFINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   1/25/17    2:56  PM  
88     BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18.1 
(i) The program is established by a State  
pursuant to State law; 
(ii) The program is administered by the 
State establishing the program, or by a  
governmental agency or instrumentality of 
the State, which is responsible for investing 
the employee savings or for selecting  
investment alternatives for employees to 
choose; 
(iii) The State assumes responsibility for the 
security of payroll deductions and employee 
savings; 
(iv) The State adopts measures to ensure 
that employees are notified of their rights 
under the program, and creates a  
mechanism for enforcement of those rights; 
(v) Participation in the program is  
voluntary for employees; 
(vi) The program does not require that an 
employee or beneficiary retain any portion 
of contributions or earnings in his or her 
IRA and does not otherwise impose any  
restrictions on withdrawals or impose any 
cost or penalty on transfers or rollovers  
permitted under the Internal Revenue 
Code; 
(vii) All rights of the employee, former  
employee, or beneficiary under the program 
are enforceable only by the employee, for-
mer employee, or beneficiary, an authorized  
representative of such a person, or by the 
State; 
(viii) The involvement of the employer is  
limited to the following: 
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(A) Collecting employee  
contributions through payroll  
deductions and remitting them to 
the program; 
(B) Providing notice to the  
employees and maintaining records 
regarding the employer's collection 
and remittance of payments under 
the program; 
(C) Providing information to the 
State . . . necessary to facilitate the 
operation of the program; and 
(D) Distributing program  
information to employees from the 
State . . . and permitting the State or 
such entity to publicize the program 
to employees; 
(ix) The employer contributes no funds to 
the program and provides no bonus or other 
monetary incentive to employees to  
participate in the program; 
(x) The employer’s participation in the  
program is required by State law; 
(xi) The employer has no discretionary  
authority, control, or responsibility under 
the program; and 
(xii) The employer receives no direct or  
indirect consideration in the form of cash or 
otherwise, other than the reimbursement of 
the actual costs of the program to the  
employer[.]104 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
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It is important to note that all of these criteria must be met 
for a state savings program to qualify for the safe harbor  
provision.105 
IV.  STATE PAYROLL DEDUCTION SAVINGS PROGRAMS 
Some states, concerned with the economic stability of their 
citizens, have created laws that require private sector employers 
to implement state-administered payroll deduction savings  
programs in their workplaces.106  Even though many states are 
currently debating whether to adopt these programs,107 this  
Article focuses on California, Illinois, and Oregon—states that 
have enacted laws creating payroll deduction savings programs 
for private-sector employees.108 
A.    California Secure Choice Retirement Savings 
Trust Act  
“The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program 
([California Program]) was established through legislation  
enacted in 2012.”109  The California Program is a retirement  
savings program administered by the state for private sector 
workers who do not have access to employee benefit plans 
through their employers.110  Importantly, the legislation  
provides that the program will only be implemented “if it is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 E.g., Bruce v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Conroe, 837 F.2d 712, 715 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (“The word ‘and’ is therefore to be accepted for its conjunctive connotation 
rather than as a word interchangeable with ‘or’ except where strict grammatical  
construction will frustrate clear legislative intent.”). 
106 Retirement Savings Challenge, supra note 8, at 2. 
107 Nancy Ober & Sean Brown, Mandatory Payroll Deduction Savings Programs 
Rise, LITTLER (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.littler.com/publication-
press/publication/mandatory-payroll-deduction-savings-programs-are-rise 
[https://perma.cc/4JZU-VBUW]. 
108 Id. 
109 California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program, OFFICE OF THE STATE 
TREASURER CALIFORNIA, http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/fast.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
R9K5-849F] (referencing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000 (2015)); S.B. 1234, 2011-12 Sess. 
(Cal. 2012). 
110  Id. (referencing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000). 
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determined that the program is [not] an employee benefit plan 
under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act.”111  
The Program creates the California Secure Choice  
Retirement Savings Trust (California Trust),112 administered by 
the nine-member California Secure Choice Retirement Savings 
Investment Board (California Board).113  All members of the  
California Board serve without compensation and are required 
to discharge their duties solely in the interest of the California  
Program participants.114  This includes an exclusive purpose 
test, where the board members must act for the “exclusive  
purposes of providing benefits to program participants and  
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the program.”115  
This also includes a prudent person test, where the board  
members must invest “with the care, skill, prudence, and  
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a  
prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with those 
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like  
character and with like aims.”116          
The California Board also has the responsibility of  
preparing a written statement of investment policy for the  
California Trust, which includes a risk management and  
oversight program.117  The investment policy will be guided by 
two overarching principles:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 CAL. GOV’T CODE at § 100043. 
112 Id. at § 100004(a) (“There is hereby established a retirement savings trust 
known as the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust to be administered 
by the board for the purpose of promoting greater retirement savings for California 
private employees in a convenient, voluntary, low-cost, and portable manner.”). 
113 Id. at § 100002(a)(1).  The nine-member board is chaired by the State  
Treasurer and includes the Director of Finance, the State Controller, “[a]n individual 
with retirement savings and investment expertise appointed by the Senate  
Committee on Rules[,] . . . [a]n employee representative appointed by the Speaker of 
the Assembly[,] . . . [a] small business representative appointed by the Governor[,]” 
and three additional members appointed by the Governor.  Id. 
114 Id. at § 100002(b), 100002(d). 
115 Id. at § 100002(d)(1). 
116 Id. at § 100002(d)(2). 
117 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(e)(2)(A). 
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[t]he primary objective of the investment policy is 
to preserve the safety of principal and provide a 
stable and low-risk rate of return [and] [t]he  
investment policy shall mitigate risk by  
maintaining a balanced investment portfolio that 
provides assurance that no single investment or 
class of investments will have a disproportionate 
impact on the total portfolio.118   
The California Board will be granted a number of powers as 
trustee for the California Trust.  This authority includes the 
power to:  
[m]ake and enter into contracts necessary for the  
administration of the trust[;] . . .  [c]ause moneys in 
the program fund to be held and invested and  
reinvested[;] . . .  [m]ake provisions for the payment 
of costs of administration and operation of the 
trust[;] . . . [e]mploy staff[;] . . . [p]rocure insurance 
against any loss in connection with the property,  
assets, or activities of the trust, and secure private 
underwriting and reinsurance to manage risk and 
insure the retirement savings rate of return[;] . . . 
[s]et minimum and maximum investment levels in 
accordance with contribution limits set for IRAs by 
the Internal Revenue Code[;] . . . [and] [f]acilitate 
compliance by the retirement savings program or  
arrangements established under the program with 
all applicable requirements for the program under 
the Internal Revenue Code[.]119   
Importantly, the board has the power to adopt regulations 
to implement these powers.120  The California Board also has the  
authority to  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Id. at § 100002(e)(2)(B). 
119 Id. at § 100010(a).  
120 Id. at § 100010(b). 
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[d]isseminate educational information concerning 
saving and planning for retirement[;] . . . determine 
the eligibility of an employer, employee, or other  
individual to participate in the program[;] . . . 
[d]esign and establish the process for the  
enrollment of program participants[;] . . . [a]llow  
participating employers to use the program to  
remit employees’ contributions to their individual 
retirement accounts on their employees’ behalf[;]  
. . . [a]llow participating employers to make their 
own contributions to their employees’ individual  
retirement accounts[;] . . . and establish the process 
by which an individual or an employee of a  
nonparticipating employer may enroll in and make 
contributions to the program.121   
The California Board must also provide employers with  
information packets that will include information disclosing how 
“employees seeking financial advice should contact financial  
advisors, that . . . [t]he [California] [P]rogram is not an  
employer-sponsored retirement plan[,] . . . [and that] the  
[California Trust] is privately insured and is not guaranteed by 
the State of California.”122 
The California Program offers a staggered approach to  
enrollment.  Three months after the program is established,  
“eligible employers with more than 100 eligible employees and 
that do not offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan or  
automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA shall have a payroll 
deposit retirement savings arrangement to allow employee  
participation in the program.”123  Six months after the program 
is established, “eligible employers with more than 50 eligible  
employees and that do not offer an employer-sponsored  
retirement plan or automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Id. at § 100012. 
122 Id. at § 100014. 
123 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(b). 
NELSONFINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   1/25/17    2:56  PM  
94     BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18.1 
shall have a payroll deposit retirement savings arrangement to 
allow employee participation in the program.”124  Nine months  
after the program is established, “all other eligible employers 
that do not offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan or  
automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA shall have a payroll 
deposit retirement savings arrangement to allow employee  
participation in the program.”125  The program provides for  
automatic enrollment, where the eligible employee must opt-out 
of the program.126 
The California Program clearly excludes employers from  
liability.127  The statute explicitly states that “[e]mployers shall 
not have any liability for an employee’s decision to participate 
in, or opt out of, the California Secure Choice Retirement  
Savings Program, or for the investment decisions of employees 
whose assets are deposited in the program[,]”128 and that 
“[e]mployers shall not be a fiduciary, or considered to be a  
fiduciary, over the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings 
Trust or the program.”129  The statute also exempts the State 
from liability with respect to payments to be made to employees 
under the program.130    
B.    Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act 
The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act was  
enacted in 2015.131  The legislation created the Illinois Secure 
Choice Savings Program (Illinois Program), which is “[a]  
retirement savings program in the form of an automatic  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Id. at § 100032(c). 
125 Id. at § 100032(d). 
126 Id. at § 100032(e)(1). 
127 Id. at § 100034(a). 
128 Id. 
129 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100034(b). 
130 Id. at § 100036 (“The [S]tate shall not have any liability for the payment of 
the retirement savings benefit earned by program participants pursuant to this  
title.”). 
131 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1 (2015).  
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enrollment payroll deduction IRA[.]”132  The legislation also  
established the Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Fund  
(Illinois Fund)133 as a trust administered by the seven-member 
Illinois Secure Choice Savings Board (Illinois Board).134  All 
“Members of the Board . . . serve without compensation.”135 
Members of the Illinois Board are required to discharge 
their duties under a fiduciary standard of conduct.136  This  
includes an exclusive purpose test, where the board member 
must act “for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to 
[program participants] and defraying reasonable expenses of 
administering the Program”137 and a prudent person test, where 
the board members must “invest[] with the care, skill, prudence, 
and diligence under the [circumstances then prevailing] that a 
prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with those 
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like  
character and with like aims[.]”138 
  The Illinois Board also has the responsibility of preparing 
“a written statement of investment policy” for the Illinois Fund, 
which “includes a risk management and oversight program.”139  
The investment policy should be  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Id. at 80/10. 
133 Id. at 80/15. 
134 Id. at 80/20.  The seven-member board is chaired by the State Treasurer and  
includes  
the State Comptroller, or his or her designee; . . . the Director of the 
Governor’s Office of Management and Budget, or his or her  
designee; . . . two public representatives with expertise in  
retirement savings plan administration or investment, or both, 
[representative of enrollees,] appointed by the Governor; . . . a  
representative of participating employers, appointed by the  
Governor; and . . . a representative of enrollees, appointed by the 
Governor.  Id. 
135 Id. at 80/20(b). 
136 Id. at 80/25. 
137 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25(1). 
138 Id. at 80/25(2). 
139 Id. at 80/35. 
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designed to ensure that an effective risk  
management system is in place to monitor the risk 
levels of the Program and Fund portfolio, to ensure 
that the risks taken are prudent and properly  
managed, to provide an integrated process for  
overall risk management, and to assess investment 
returns as well as risk to determine if the risks 
taken are adequately compensated compared to  
applicable performance benchmarks and  
standards.140  
The Illinois Board is granted broad power to effectuate its 
duties as fiduciary to the Illinois Fund.141  The board has the  
authority to: 
[e]xplore and establish investment options[;] . . . 
[m]ake and enter into contracts necessary for the  
administration of the Program and Fund[;] . . . 
[d]etermine the number and duties of staff  
members needed to administer the Program and 
assemble such a staff[;] . . . [e]valuate and establish 
the process by which an enrollee is able to  
contribute a portion of his or her wages to the  
Program for automatic deposit of those  
contributions and the process by which the  
participating employer provides a payroll deposit 
retirement savings arrangement to forward those 
contributions and related information to the  
Program[;] . . . [d]esign and establish the process 
for enrollment . . . including the process by which 
an employee can opt not to participate in the  
Program[;] . . . [e]valuate and establish the process 
by which an individual may voluntarily enroll in 
and make contributions to the Program[;] . . . [and] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Id. at 80/35. 
141 Id. at 80/30(s).  The board is authorized to “[e]xercise any and all other  
powers reasonably necessary for the effectuation of the purposes, objectives, and  
provisions of this Act pertaining to the Program.”  Id. 
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[e]valuate the need for, and procure as needed,  
insurance against any and all loss in connection 
with the property, assets, or activities of the  
Program[.]142  
The Illinois Board also has the authority to “design and  
disseminate to all employers an employer information packet 
and an employee information packet, which shall include  
background information on the Program, [and] appropriate  
disclosures for employees[.]”143  The information packet includes 
information regarding the “mechanics of how to make  
contributions to the Program; . . . how to opt out of the Program; 
. . . the process for withdrawal of retirement savings; . . . [and] 
how to obtain additional information about the Program[.]”144  
The information packet must also include information disclosing 
how “employees seeking financial advice should contact financial 
advisors, . . . that the Program is not an employer-sponsored  
retirement plan[,] and . . . [that the trust is privately insured 
and] is not guaranteed by the State [of Illinois].”145  
The Illinois Program is limited to employers with twenty-
five or more employees that have been in business for two 
years.146  The statute excludes employers from liability, stating 
that “[p]articipating employers shall not have any liability for an  
employee’s decision to participate in, or opt out of, the Program 
or for the investment decisions of the Board or of any  
enrollee[,]”147 and “[a] participating employer shall not be a  
fiduciary, or considered to be a fiduciary, over the Program.”148  
The statute also exempts the State from liability with respect to 
payments to be made to employees under the Program.149 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Id. at 80/30. 
143 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/55(a). 
144 Id. at 80/55(c)(2)-(6). 
145 Id. at 80/55(c)(7)-(9). 
146 Id. at 80/5. 
147 Id. at 80/75(a).  
148 Id. at 80/75(b). 
149 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/70(a). 
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C.    Oregon Retirement Savings Board Act  
The Oregon Retirement Savings Board Act was enacted in 
2015.150  The legislation created the Oregon Retirement Savings 
Plan (Oregon Program), which is a retirement savings program 
in the form of an automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA,151 
as a trust administered by the seven-member Oregon  
Retirement Savings Board (Oregon Board).152  Members of the 
board are required to discharge their duties under a prudent 
person test, where the board members must “exercise the  
judgment and care then prevailing that persons of prudence,  
discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of their 
own affairs with due regard to the probable income and level of 
risk from certain types of investments of money[.]”153     
The Oregon Board is granted broad power to effectuate its 
duties.154  The board has the authority   
[t]o establish, implement and maintain the plan[;]  
. . . adopt rules for the general administration of 
the plan[;] . . . direct the investment of the funds  
contributed to accounts in the plan consistent with 
the investment restrictions established by the 
board[;] . . . collect application, account or  
administrative fees to defray the costs of  
administering the plan[;] . . . [and] make and enter 
into contracts, agreements or arrangements, and to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 OR. REV. STAT. § 557.3 (2015). 
151 Id. at § 557.3(1)(a)-(c). 
152 Id. at § 557.1(1)-(2).  The seven-member board is chaired by the State  
Treasurer and includes “a representative of employers[,] . . . experience in the field of 
investments[,] . . . “a representative of an association representing employees[,] . . . a 
public member who is retired,” all appointed by the Governor.  Id. at §  
557.1(1)(b)(A)-(D).  The Senate must confirm members of the board appointed by the 
Governor.  The board shall also include “a member of the Senate appointed by the 
President of the Senate to be a nonvoting advisory member of the board[,] . . . [and a] 
member of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House of  
Representatives to be a nonvoting advisory member of the board.”  Id. at § 
557.1(1)(c)-(d) 
153 Id. at § 557.2(2)(c).   
154 Id. at § 557.2(2)(b).   
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retain, employ and contract for any of the following 
considered necessary or desirable, for carrying out 
the purposes set forth in [the Act].155 
The board must create rules that  
[e]stablish the process for participants to make the 
default contributions to plan accounts and to adjust 
the contribution levels[;] . . . the process for  
employers to withhold employee contributions to 
plan accounts from employees’ wages and send the 
contributions to the investment administrator for 
the plan[;] . . . the process for allowing employees to 
opt out of enrollment in the plan[;] . . . [and] the  
process for participants to make nonpayroll  
contributions to plan accounts.156   
The legislation exempts employers from any liability with  
respect to the Oregon Program.157  The statute explicitly states 
that the law will “[n]ot impose any duties under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) 
on employers.”158  The statute also exempts the State from  
liability with respect to payments to be made to employees under 
the Oregon Program.159   
V.  LOOKING AT STATES’ LEGISLATION UNDER THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PROPOSED RULEMAKING 
The proposed regulation sets a safe harbor for state payroll 
deduction savings programs.160  However, even with this  
regulation, the DOL is cognizant that the  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Id. at § 557.2.   
156 OR. REV. STAT. § 557.4(2)-(5).   
157 Id. at § 557.4(9)(g). 
158 Id. at § 557.3(1)(p).   
159 Id. at § 557.3(2).   
160 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,006 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Pt. 2510). 
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proposed regulation would provide that certain 
state savings programs would not create employee 
benefit plans.  However, the fact that state  
programs do not create ERISA covered plans does 
not necessarily mean that, if the issue were  
litigated, the state laws would not be preempted by 
ERISA.  The courts’ determinations would depend 
on the precise details of the statute at issue,  
including whether that state's program successfully 
met the requirements of the safe harbor.161  
This Part addresses this concern and provides an analysis of 
each states’ program under the proposed safe harbor  
regulation. 
A. Judicial Deference to Federal Agency Regulations 
It is important to understand the history of jurisprudence 
when the courts grant deference to administrative  
interpretations of statutes that the agency is empowered to  
implement.  The question of deference to the DOL rulemaking 
will become important if a legal challenge is filed against the 
rule.  Judging by the industry reaction to this rulemaking and 
the DOL conflict of interest rulemaking discussed elsewhere in 
this Article,162 a legal challenge seems likely.  This section will 
discuss the Supreme Court’s views on agency deference pre- and 
post-Chevron.163        
In Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,164 employees of Swift & Co. 
“brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act [(FLSA)] 
. . . to recover overtime, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ 
fees[.]”165  The issue was whether “waiting time” spent in a  
stand-by capacity on the company premises—not active duty, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Id. at 72,010-11. 
162 See discussion infra Section VI.H. 
163 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
164 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  
165 Id. at 135.   
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but time the employees were subject to emergency calls—was  
included as “working time” under the FLSA.166  In  
administrative rulings and opinions, the Administrator of the 
Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, provided 
practical guidance for employees and employers as to how the 
DOL would seek to enforce the FLSA.167   
 The Supreme Court found that there was “no statutory  
provision as to what, if any, deference courts should pay to the 
Administrator’s conclusions.”168  The Supreme Court held that 
the 
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the  
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling 
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do  
constitute a body of experience and informed  
judgment to which courts and litigants may  
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the  
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the  
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.169  
 The Skidmore decision reflects that even though the  
Supreme Court believed that the Administrator had special  
experience in the area of labor law, his interpretation of the 
FLSA was not owed deference by the court.170  This decision also  
reflected the ad hoc nature of deference before the Chevron  
decision, and was not based upon any type of structured analysis 
for determining whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of 
a statute.171  This ad hoc approach resulted in courts choosing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Id. at 136-38. 
167 Id. at 138. 
168 Id. at 139. 
169 Id. at 140. 
170 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40. 
171 Id. 
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analyze statutes without any attention to, let alone deference to, 
prior agency interpretations.172  Courts would not provide a  
structured analysis for applying deference to agency  
interpretation until forty years later in Chevron.173   
 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense  
Council,174  
[e]nvironmental groups filed a petition to review  
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  
regulations (40 CFR 51.18(j)(1)) that allow states to 
treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within 
the same industrial grouping as though they were 
encased within a single “bubble.” The regulations 
were promulgated to implement 172(b)(6) of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (42 USCS 
7502(b)(6)), which requires states that have not 
achieved the national air quality standards  
established by the EPA to establish a permit  
program regulating new or modified major  
stationary sources of air pollution.175   
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of  
Columbia Circuit set aside the regulations, holding that the 
“bubble” concept was inappropriate in programs enacted to  
improve air quality.176  The Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court’s decision by holding that “the EPA regulations allowing 
states to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the 
same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a 
single ‘bubble’ were based on a reasonable construction of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First 
Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 447, 463 (2013). 
173 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.  
Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
174 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
175 Preview Chevron, U-CURSOS, https://www.u-cusos.cl/derecho/2010/2/ 
D123D0823/6/material_docente/previsualizar?id_material=330944 [https://perma.cc/ 
72BQ-UYUG] [hereinafter Preview Chevron]. 
176 Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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term ‘stationary source’ in 172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977.”177 
The Supreme Court used Chevron to enunciate a new two-
part test for courts to follow when deciding whether to give  
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory  
provisions.178  Under the Chevron test, the first question the  
reviewing court must answer is “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”179  “If the intent of  
Congress is clear” from the language of the statute, the court’s 
deference analysis ends.180  “[T]he court, as well as the  
[administering] agency, must give effect to the unambiguous[]  
. . . intent of Congress.”181  If the court finds that “Congress has 
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court 
[must avoid] impos[ing] its own construction on the statute[.]”182  
“If the statute is silent” as to the precise question at issue, “the 
question for the court [becomes] whether the agency’s  
[interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the  
statute.183 
It is important to note that the crux of any judicial review is 
whether the clear intent of Congress is given effect.184  “The  
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory  
construction and must reject administrative constructions which 
are contrary to clear congressional intent.”185  However, the 
court reaffirmed that the wisdom of the agency’s policy choice is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Preview Chevron, supra note 175. 
178 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 842-43.   
182 Id. at 843. 
183 Id.  When looking at the agency interpretation, the court does not need to 
conclude that it would have reached the same conclusion had the question arisen in a 
judicial proceeding.  See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial  
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. U.S., 437 U.S. 443, 
450 (1978); Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); Udall  
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of Ala. v. Aragon, 
329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1921). 
184 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
185 Id. at 843 n.9. 
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not subject to judicial resolution, but that the “Constitution vests 
such responsibilities in the political branches.”186   
It is also informative to review the post-Chevron line of  
cases to see the construction of the doctrine and how it has been 
applied.  The doctrine of deference was created in part due to the 
judicial recognition “that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an  
implicit delegation from Congress to [an] agency to fill in the  
statutory gaps[,]”187 and that Congress meant for “the ambiguity 
[to] be resolved, first and foremost, by the [desired agency], . . . 
rather than courts[.]”188  However, as discussed below, the  
deference given to agencies has boundaries.189         
Courts have clarified Chevron’s application, holding that  
deference only applies if an agency’s interpretation is the  
product of a formal agency process, such as notice-and-comment  
rulemaking, through which Congress has authorized the agency 
“to speak with the force of law.”190  This is important with  
respect to the current proposed rulemaking, where the DOL has  
submitted the proposed regulation for notice and comment.191     
Courts have affirmed that deference will only be granted to 
an agency charged with administration of the statute being  
interpreted.192  For example, in Gonzales v. Oregon,193 the  
Supreme Court held that Chevron deference is not accorded to 
an administrative rule because the governing statute is  
ambiguous; “the rule must be promulgated pursuant to authority 
Congress has delegated to the [agency].”194  Courts have also  
affirmed that administrative agencies are better equipped to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Id. at 866 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). 
187 Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
159 (2000). 
188 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996). 
189 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
190 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001). 
191 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,009 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Pt. 2510). 
192 Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 478 n.14 (1997). 
193 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
194 Id. at 258. 
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opine on the policy implications of interpreting a statute.195  In 
Nat’l. Fed’n. of Fed. Employees, Local 1309 v. Dep’t. of the  
Interior,196 the Supreme Court held that an agency charged with 
administering a statute is better suited than the judiciary to 
make interpretive decisions that affect various policy-related 
considerations underlying the statute.197   
B.  State Law Compliance with Proposed Rulemaking 
The proposed regulation lists twelve criteria that must be 
met for a state payroll deduction savings program to comply 
with the safe harbor provision.198  This Section discusses  
whether the California, Illinois, and Oregon laws comply with 
the criteria for the safe harbor.  This analysis is very important, 
as each state law includes a provision stating that the state  
savings programs will only be implemented if the program is  
determined to not be an employee benefit plan under ERISA.199     
1.    Program Established Pursuant to State Law 
The proposed regulation requires that the savings program 
must be established by the State.200  All three programs are  
established by statute,201 and, therefore, are established by the 
State.  All three state programs meet this first criterion.202    
2.    Program Administered by the State  
The proposed regulation requires that the state payroll  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps, Local 1309 v. Dep’t of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 95 
(1999). 
196 Id.    
197 See id. at 99. 
198 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,009. 
199 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(k); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/95; OR. REV. STAT. § 
557.15(2).  
200 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
201 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100004; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/10; OR. REV. STAT. § 
557.3(1). 
202 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,007. 
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deduction savings program be “administered by the State  
establishing the program, or by [the] governmental agency or  
instrumentality of the State, . . . responsible for investing the  
employee savings or for selecting investment alternatives for  
employees to choose.”203  A statutorily established board  
administers all three programs.204  Additionally, each board has 
the responsibility of directing the investment of program 
funds.205  Therefore, all three State laws meet this criterion for 
the safe harbor. 
3.    State Must Assume Responsibility for the Security of 
Payroll Deductions and Employee Savings 
The proposed regulation requires that the State assumes  
responsibility for the security of payroll deductions and  
employee savings.206  Under the California law, while the State 
will be exempt from liability in connection with funding  
retirement benefits, “the [California] [B]oard shall ensure that 
an insurance, annuity, or other funding mechanism is [always] 
in place [to] . . . protect[] the value of individuals’ accounts.”207  
Under the Illinois law, while the State is exempt from liability in 
connection with funding retirement benefits, the Illinois Board 
“[e]valuate[s] the need for, and procure[s] as needed, insurance 
against any and all loss in connection with the [Illinois 
Fund].”208  Under the Oregon law, while the State is exempt 
from liability in connection with funding retirement benefits, the 
Oregon Board “evaluate[s] the need for, and procure[s] as  
needed, . . . private insurance for [the Oregon Plan].”209 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Id. at 72,014. 
204 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(a)(1); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/10; OR. REV. STAT. § 
557.1(1). 
205 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(b); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/40(a); OR. REV. STAT. § 
557.2(2)(c). 
206 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
207 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100012(c), 100013. 
208 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(c), (k). 
209 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 557.2, 557.3. 
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Only the California law explicitly meets this criterion.210   
Under the Illinois and Oregon laws, the State is exempt from  
liability and has no explicit duty to insure the funding of  
retirement benefits.211  For Illinois and Oregon to meet this  
requirement, there must be an explicit mandate to implement a 
mechanism to secure payroll deductions and employee  
savings.212  
In a comment letter to the DOL, representatives from  
Illinois, California, and Oregon voiced concerns with the broad 
language of this provision and noted that each state had  
“existing wage theft provisions governing the handling of  
withholdings, which should be suitable for program funds sent 
by the employer to the employee’s account directly.”213  The issue 
of security of payroll deductions is discussed later in this  
Article.214    
4.    State Must Adopt Measures to Ensure Employees are 
Notified and Create a Mechanism for Enforcement of 
Rights Under Program  
   The proposed regulation requires that “[t]he State adopt 
measures to ensure that employees are notified of their rights  
under the program, and create[] a mechanism for enforcement of 
those rights[.]”215  Under the California law, the California 
Board must design and disseminate an employee information 
packet with information regarding the California Program.216  
The California law grants the California Department of  
Insurance the authority to impose penalties on employers who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100012-100013. 
211 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/70(a); See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 557.2, 557.3. 
212 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
213 Letter from John Chiang et al., to Office of Regulations and Interpretations, 
Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. 1, 3 (Jan. 19, 2015), 
http://www.osc.ct.gov/crsb/docs/JointDOLLetter_CA_CT_IL_OR.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
58YZ-PQ8U] [hereinafter Chiang Letter]. 
214 See discussion infra Section VI.H. 
215 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
216 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100014. 
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do not enroll employees in the Program; however, there is no 
mechanism for employees to enforce their rights under the  
Program.217  Under the Illinois law, the Illinois Board must  
design and disseminate an employee information packet with  
information regarding the Illinois Program.218  The Illinois law 
also grants the Illinois Department of Revenue with the  
authority to impose penalties on employers who do not enroll 
employees in the Program.219  Additionally, because the Illinois 
Board operates as a fiduciary to the Program, employees will be 
able to bring an action against the board for breach of its  
fiduciary duty.220  Under the Oregon law, the Oregon Board 
must provide disclosures to employee participants about  
participation in the Oregon Program.221  However, the Oregon 
law does not provide the Oregon Board with enforcement  
authority over noncompliance by employers, nor does it provide 
any explicit mechanism to enforce employee’s rights.222 
In their comment letter to the DOL, representatives from  
Illinois, California, and Oregon voiced concerns with the broad 
language of this provision and noted that each state had existing 
wage and employment laws that would meet the requirements 
under the proposed rulemaking.223 As discussed below, this  
Article recommends that the DOL should provide that states 
may rely on current laws, as long as they are referenced in the  
regulations and the state provides a brief explanation of why the 
current law meets the requirement under the proposed  
rulemaking.224  The issue of enforcement of employees’ rights is 
discussed later in this Article.225     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE. § 1088.9(c)-(d) (2015). 
218 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/55(a). 
219 Id. at 80/85(a). 
220 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6 (2012). 
221 OR. REV. STAT. § 557.4(9). 
222 See id. at § 557.2. 
223 Chiang Letter, supra note 213, at 3. 
224 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
225 See discussion infra Part V.B.vii. 
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5.    Participation in the Program is Voluntary for 
Employees  
The proposed regulation requires that employee  
participation be voluntary.226 The DOL clarifies this provision by 
finding that a state savings plan will not fail to meet the safe  
harbor conditions merely because it requires automatic  
enrollment subject to employees having a right to opt out.227       
All three State laws provide for automatic enrollment of  
eligible employees and allow those employees to opt out of the  
savings program.228  Therefore, under the proposed regulation, 
employee participation is voluntary under each of the State 
laws.229  This provision is interesting, because it contradicts 
ERISA preemption jurisprudence, which has traditionally found 
that an employee’s participation is only completely voluntary if it 
is self-initiated, rather than an opt-out arrangement.230  Because 
of the deference granted to agency regulations,231 this provision 
will likely be upheld and each State law will likely be found in 
compliance. 
6.    Program Must Not Impose Restrictions on 
Withdrawals or Impose Penalties on Transfers or 
Rollovers 
The proposed regulation requires that the State savings  
program cannot restrict withdrawal and cannot impose penalties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
227 Id. 
228 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/10, 80/30(i); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 557.3(c). 
229 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100004(a); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(j); OR. REV. STAT.§ 
557.4(1). 
230 See, e.g., Int’l Res., Inc. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, 298-99 (6th Cir. 
1991) (holding that regulatory exception did not apply partly because coverage was 
“automatic applied to all employees”); Kanne v. Conn Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 
489, 492-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (contrasting “voluntary” participation with  
“automatic” participation). 
231 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
NELSONFINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   1/25/17    2:56  PM  
110     BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18.1 
on transfers or rollovers.232  Under each state law, respective 
boards are required to disclose to employees the process for  
withdrawing retirement savings;233 however, none of the laws  
provide any specific guidance on how to do so.234  The Oregon 
law is the only state law that provides information concerning  
rollovers, stating that the Oregon Plan must allow for account 
owners to maintain an account regardless of where they are  
employed and have the ability to roll over funds into other  
retirement accounts.235  Because the state laws do not provide  
specific guidance on withdrawals and rollovers,236 it is unclear 
on whether the laws would comply with the proposed regulation.  
The states could look to the Department of the Treasury’s 
MyRA program for guidance on how to handle withdrawals and 
rollovers.  Under Treasury regulations, MyRA participants can 
transfer their balance to a commercial retirement product  
available in the marketplace.237  Additionally, “[b]ecause the  
accounts offered through the [MyRA] program are Roth IRAs,  
participants also have the flexibility to withdraw their  
contributions at any time without a penalty.”238  The MyRA  
program also imposes a ceiling on assets—once the participant’s 
account balance reaches $15,000 or its thirty-year lifespan, the 
participant’s account balance may be transferred into a private-
sector Roth IRA.239  The issue of portability of the employee’s  
retirement accounts is discussed later in this Article.240   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
233 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100014(b); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/55(c); OR. REV. STAT. § 
557.4(9). 
234 See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000-100044; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80; OR. REV. 
STAT. § 557. 
235 OR. REV. STAT. § 557.3(k). 
236 See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000-100044; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80; OR. REV. 
STAT. § 557. 
237 myRA – my Retirement Account: Frequently Asked Questions, THE DEP’T  
OF THE TREASURY, 4 (Jan. 2015), https://myra.gov/files/myRA_FAQ.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HPT7-ELTW]. 
238 Regulations Governing Retirement Savings Bonds, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,023  
(December 15, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 347).  
239 Id. 
240 See discussion infra Part VI.F. 
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7.    Employee Rights Are Enforceable Only by Employee, 
Former Employee, or by the State 
The proposed regulation requires that employee rights are 
enforceable by the employee, former employee, or the state.241  
This provision is similar to the second sentence in the fourth  
criterion under the proposed regulation, which states that the 
State law must create a mechanism for enforcement of rights  
under the state savings program.242  The Illinois and California 
laws grant the State the authority to impose penalties on  
employers who do not enroll employees in the respective state  
savings programs.243  Additionally, as noted above, the Illinois 
law imposes a fiduciary duty on the Illinois Board;244 because 
the board operates as a fiduciary to the Illinois Program,  
employees will be able to bring an action against the Illinois 
Board for breach of its fiduciary duty.245  The Oregon law does 
not grant the State or individual employees with the authority to 
enforce employees’ rights,246 and therefore, does not meet the 
criteria for this provision. 
8.    Limited Employer Involvement and Prohibition on 
Employer Contributions 
The proposed regulation requires that employers have  
limited involvement with a state savings program.247  To  
determine whether the employer’s involvement meets this  
criterion, the regulation requires that employer involvement is 
limited to  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
242 Id. 
243 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1088.9(c)-(d); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/85(a).  
244 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25. 
245 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6. 
246 See OR. REV. STAT. § 557. 
247 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
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[c]ollecting employee contributions through payroll 
deductions and remitting them to the program; 
[p]roviding notice to the employees and  
maintaining records regarding the employer's  
collection and remittance of payments under the 
program; [p]roviding information to the State . . . 
necessary to facilitate the operation of the program; 
and [d]istributing program information to  
employees from the State . . . and permitting the 
State or such entity to publicize the program to 
employees.248   
The proposed regulation also prohibits employer contributions to 
individual employee accounts.249      
Each State program requires employers to set up payroll  
deduction systems and provide information to employees about 
participation.250  However, the California law goes further:  
under the law, because the employer is allowed to make  
contributions to employee’s individual accounts, the law would 
not meet the criterion for this provision.251 
The Oregon law requires employers to provide information 
to employees and set up the payroll deduction;252 however,  
employers are still prohibited from contributing to individual  
employee accounts.253  The Illinois law is silent on whether  
employer contributions are prohibited.254  Because the Illinois 
law does not explicitly allow employer contributions, I would  
argue that the Illinois law meets the criterion for this provision.  
I would suggest that the Illinois Board promulgate a rule that 
would prohibit employer contributions; this action would ensure  
compliance with this provision.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(h); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(h), 80/55(a); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 557.3. 
251 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(h). 
252 OR. REV. STAT. § 557.3. 
253 Id. at § 557.3(1)(h). 
254 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(j). 
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9.    Employer Participation in the Program is Required 
by State Law 
The proposed regulation requires that state law require  
employer participation.255  All three state laws require  
employers to provide a payroll deposit retirement savings  
arrangement for eligible employees.256  However, California and 
Illinois provide exemptions based on size of the company;257 for 
example, the California Program exempts employers with less 
than five employees258 and Illinois exempts employers with less 
than twenty-five employees.259  Under the current language of 
the proposed rule, California and Illinois would not meet this  
criterion.  The DOL should therefore provide a hardship  
exemption that would provide States with the flexibility to  
determine which employers may be exempt from the mandatory 
adoption requirement.  
10.    Employer Has No Discretionary Authority, Control, 
or Responsibility Under the Program 
The proposed regulation requires that employers have “no 
discretionary authority, control, or responsibility under the 
[state] program.”260  All three state laws exempt employers from 
the responsibility of administration or investment of the  
Program, and exempt employers from liability with respect to 
investment returns or Program design.261  Therefore, all three 
state laws meet this criterion for the safe harbor.       
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
256 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(h); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/60(a); OR. REV. STAT. § 
557.3(1)(b). 
257 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000(c)(2)(d), 100012(h); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5, 
80/60(b). 
258 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000(d). 
259 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5. 
260 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
261 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100034(b); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/75(b) OR. REV. STAT. § 
557.3(p). 
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11.    Employer Receives No Consideration, Other than for 
the Reimbursement of the Actual Costs of the 
Program 
The proposed regulation prohibits employers from being  
compensated for any obligation outside of the actual cost of  
setting up payroll deposit retirement savings arrangement for 
their employees.262  All three state laws require the State to pay 
for administrative costs, including those incurred by employers, 
until sufficient assets are available in the Programs to cover 
those costs.263  Because the state laws do not provide for any  
compensation to employers other than for administrative costs  
incurred, all three state laws meet this criterion for the safe  
harbor.264   
VI.  POLICY CONCERNS WITH STATE LAWS  
While many agree that there is a retirement crisis in the 
United States, there is no consensus as to how to address the  
issue.  Industry and consumer groups differ on the effectiveness 
of state-based retirement plans.  Industry groups such as the  
Financial Services Institute (FSI), Investment Company  
Institute (ICI), National Association of Insurance and Financial 
Advisors (NAIFA), American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI), 
and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA) generally oppose state-run retirement plans.265   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
263 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100042; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.225. 
264 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
265 Mark Schoeff, Jr., FSI to Fight States on auto IRAs: Independent broker-
dealer group says plans pose competition to financial advisors, INVESTMENTNEWS 
(Dec. 17, 2014, 2:24 PM) http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20141217/FREE/ 
141219922/fsi-to-fight-rollout-of-auto-iras [https://perma.cc/PQH7-64WJ]; Letter 
from David W. Blass, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Office of Regulations and  
Interpretations, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 19, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EBSA-2015-0018-0064& 
attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc 
/BV34-2H9A] [hereinafter Blass Letter]; Letter from Gary A. Sanders, Counsel and 
Vice President, Gov’t Relations, Nat’l Ass’n of Insurance and Fin. Advisors, to Office 
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Consumer groups such as the American Association of Retired 
Persons (AARP) and Pension Rights Center (PRC) support state-
run retirement plans.266  This Section will discuss a number of 
the policy implications arising from state-run retirement plans 
and endeavors in response to a number of the opposition  
arguments.        
A.    Will Reduce Savers’ Access to Current Private 
Sector Savings Options and Professional Advice 
Opponents of state-run retirement plans argue that there 
are already a number of private sector retirement options,  
including 401(k) plans, 403(b) plans, 401(a) plans, 457(b) plans, 
SIMPLE IRAs, SEP IRAs, and traditional IRAs.267   While this 
statement is true, the vast majority of empirical research shows 
that workers without employer-based retirement plans are not  
utilizing these services.268  Research also demonstrates that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Regulations and Interpretations, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. 
(Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EBSA-
2015-0018-0037&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4SPS-MNMS] [hereinafter Sanders Letter]; Letter from James H. 
Szostek, Vice President, Taxes & Ret. Sec. & Howard M. Bard, Vice President, Taxes 
& Ret. Sec., to Office of Regulations and Interpretations, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., 
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. 1, 2 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.dol.gov/ 
sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/ 
1210-AB76/00022.pdf [https://perma.cc/R59X-PKH9] [hereinafter Szostek & Bard 
Letter]; Letter from Lisa J. Bleier, Managing Dir. and Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Securities 
Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Sec. Perez, Office of Regulations and Interpretations, 
Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. 1, 2 (Jan. 19, 2016), 
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EBSA-2015-0018-0031& 
attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
U6SV-AQUU] [hereinafter Bleier Letter]. 
266 Melissa Kahn & Jody Strakosch, Making State Retirement Plans Work for  
Private Employers: Including Lifetime Income Options, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 
2016), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2015/making-state-retirement-
plans-work-for-private-employers-spotlight.pdf, [https://perma.cc/TCC4-YRG5];  
Letter from Norman Stein, Senior Pol’y Advisor, Pension Rights  
Center, to Office of Regulations and Interpretations, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. 
DEP’T OF LAB. 1, 2-3 (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer? 
documentId=EBSA-2015-0018-0067&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment 
&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/ 6G75-35AT] [hereinafter Stein Letter]. 
267 Szostek & Bard Letter, supra note 265, at 3. 
268 The Role of IRAs in U.S. Households’ Saving for Retirement, 2014,  
21 ICI RES. PERSP. 1, 1-3 (Jan. 2015), https://www.ici.org/pdf/per21-01.pdf 
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workers do not take the initiative to learn about their  
investment options, do not take the affirmative steps needed to 
start saving, and fail to make regular contributions.269  Without 
empirical evidence to show that workers without employer-based  
retirement plans are successfully utilizing these private sector 
tools, the opposition argument is without merit.     
The importance of a savings plan is clearly illustrated in the 
2015 Employee Benefit Research Institute Retirement  
Confidence Survey.270  The survey found “increased confidence 
since 2013 [that] is strongly related to retirement plan  
participation.  Among those with a plan, the percentage [of] ‘very 
confident’ increased from 14 percent in 2013 to 28 percent in 
2015.  In contrast, the percentage of ‘very confident’ remained 
statistically unchanged among those without a plan (10 percent 
in 2013, 9 percent in 2014, and 12 percent in 2015).”271 
Opponents of state-run retirement plans further argue that 
“[d]espite state lawmakers’ best intentions, the net result of  
these efforts could be a reduction in investor choice and further  
limitation of access to high-quality, objective financial  
guidance.”272  Specifically, opponents argue that these plans will 
compete “against small [financial advisors] [who] are working 
hard to address the[] needs” of middle-class workers.273 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[https://perma.cc/9PVU-8YBJ] (An IRA is an option for employees with no employer-
sponsored retirement plan.  “Only 12% of U.S. households contributed to any type of 
IRA in 2013.”). 
269 Jodi DiCenzo & Paul Fronstin, Lessons From the Evolution of 401(k)  
Retirement Plans for Increased Consumerism in Health Care: An Application of  
Behavioral Research, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1, 13-14 (Aug. 2008), 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_08-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/66KK-
Z7Q3]. 
270 Ruth Helman, Craig Copeland, & Jack VanDerhei, The 2015 Retirement  
Confidence Survey: Having a Retirement Savings Plan a Key Factor in Americans’  
Retirement Confidence, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1, 20 (Apr. 2015), 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_413_Apr15_RCS-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K9KP-BPG3]. 
271 Id. at 1. 
272 Dale E. Brown, The case against state-run retirement plans, 
INVESTMENTNEWS (Aug. 28, 2014, 12:26 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/  
article/20140828/BLOG09/140829925 [https://perma.cc/6USL-ZMZS]. 
273 Schoeff, supra note 265. 
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Contrary to opposition claims, the empirical evidence  
reflects that without these plans, middle-income workers will 
neither save nor receive professional financial advice.274  First, 
regardless of whether the financial advisor serves the client  
under a commission-based, fee and commission, or fee-only  
business model, lower and middle-income workers cannot always 
afford to pay for professional advice.275  Second, these plans are 
only enacted to provide retirement savings vehicles to employees 
who currently do not have access to a workplace retirement  
savings plan;276 essentially, the opposition makes the untenable 
argument that the state is reducing investor choice by providing 
access to a workplace retirement plan that does not currently  
exist.277   
This Article contends that the state-run retirement plans 
will provide financial advisors with an increase in future  
clients.278  For example, lower and middle-income workers who 
did not have access to a workplace retirement savings plan and 
could not save will now have the ability to save in the state-run 
retirement plan.279  Once the worker is financially stable, he or 
she can then decide to rollover the funds in the state-run plan to 
an IRA or other private retirement vehicle, where the financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Dan Iannicola, Jr. & Jonas Parker, Barriers to Financial Advice to Non-
Affluent Consumers, THE FIN. LITERACY GROUP 1, 39 (Sept. 2010), 
https://www.soa.org/researchbarriers/ [https://perma.cc/U9KM-NXRK]. 
275 Id. at 5-6.  (“[D]espite the need, the data consistently demonstrate that  
non-affluent consumers are not accessing financial advice from licensed and  
informed professionals.  Fewer than half (47 percent) of all consumers have ever used 
the services of a financial professional for retirement planning, a trend that has  
persisted since at least the 1980s.”) 
276 State Run Retirement Plan Proposals Resource Center, SEC. INDUSTRY AND 
FIN. MARKETS ASS’N (2016), http://www.sifma.org/issues/savings-and-
retirement/state-run-retirement-plan-proposals/overview/ [https://perma.cc/5TFN-
VCEH] [hereinafter Resource Center]. 
277 Brown, supra note 272. 
278 See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
279 Peter M. Kelly, State Retirement Plans for Private Employers, ABA JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON EMP. BENEFITS AND THE AM. COLLEGE OF BENEFITS COUNS. (May 10, 
2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/employee_benefits/EB 
1605WEB15_PPT.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AR2-BYZE].  
NELSONFINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   1/25/17    2:56  PM  
118     BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18.1 
advisor could then help manage those assets.280   
To support this claim, according to ICI, 85% of households 
undertaking a rollover since 2010 transferred their entire  
retirement plan balances into traditional IRAs, and “[87% of] 
new traditional IRAs in 2012 were opened [exclusively] with  
rollovers.”281  Importantly, according to the Employee Benefits  
Research Institute, thirteen times more money was rolled over 
into IRAs as was directly contributed to IRAs in 2011—this data 
reflects the importance in employees having access to a  
workplace savings plan.282                 
B.    Burden on Fiscally-Strained States 
Opponents argue that state-run retirement plans would  
burden fiscally-strained states with additional costs and liability 
to operate the state-run programs.283  While these are legitimate 
concerns over the cost of state-run programs, the opposition 
greatly exaggerates those claims.  This Article argues that based 
upon the structure of the state programs discussed above, there 
would be reasonable costs incurred by the state. 284   
States do not bear the full burden of implementing the  
savings programs.285  For example, in California, “[f]unding for 
the market and feasibility study must come from private  
nonprofit or for-profit entities, or from federal sources.  The use 
of State funds . . . is prohibited.”286  Additionally, states can  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 2015 Investment Company Fact Book, THE INV. CO. INST. 1, 153 (2015), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R3A-ZM66]. 
281 Id. 
282 Craig Copeland, Individual Retirement Account Balances, Contributions, and 
Rollovers, 2011: The EBRI IRA Database, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (May 2013), 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_05-13.No386.IRAs.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/HM9C-32YC]. 
283 Blass Letter, supra note 265; Bleier Letter, supra note 265, at 2. 
284 See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
285 See, e.g., Grant Boyken, Request for Information (RFI) from Financial Service 
Providers, Experts and Scholars, SECURE CHOICE RETIREMENT SAVINGS INV. BOARD 
1, 3 (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/staff/2013/20130904/4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L9EM-QLXM]. 
286 Id. 
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leverage the experience they have gained with respect to  
implementing Section 529 college savings programs and state 
employee retirement savings programs.287     
The state laws provide that the state must bear the initial 
costs of the program;288 however, each law is structured to create 
a self-sustaining trust that pays the administrative costs of the 
Program.289  The State laws provide for uniform enrollment  
materials, created by the state, which employers distribute to 
their employees.290  By using uniform materials, the expense to 
the state will be greatly minimized.  Additionally, the state-run 
retirement programs, if successful, would allow millions of  
workers to become financially self-sufficient, and could reduce 
the burden on state services.  So even if the state-run retirement 
plans increased costs to the state in the near term, they would 
be compensated for in the long-run.      
  Opponents argue that states cannot establish a successful 
state-run retirement savings program given the economic status 
of several public pension plans.291  This Article contends that 
this is a misleading argument.  First, unlike public pension 
plans, the state would only be funding the initial costs of the 
program. 292  Second, unlike public pension plans, the state does 
not have discretion whether to or how much to fund the state-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 69980 (2015); 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/16.5 (2015); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 178.300 (2015). 
288 See generally CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 100042; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30; OR. 
REV. STAT. § 178.225. 
289 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 100042; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.225. 
290 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 100014; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/55; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.205. 
291 One example provided by the opposition is that “[t]he Teachers’ Retirement 
System of the State of Illinois is one of the worst funded public pensions in the  
nation.  In 2013, it held enough assets to cover only 41 percent of its future  
obligations.”  Richard W. Johnson & Benjamin G. Southgate, Evaluating Retirement 
Income Security for Illinois Public School Teachers: Public Pension Project Report, 
URB. INST. 1 (Jul. 2014), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED559321.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VV5S-2H9F]. 
292 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 100042; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.225. 
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run programs.293  Third, each state law has designated a board 
to oversee the program, which includes government regulators 
and public and private parties.294  Fourth, unlike public pension 
plans, the state-run retirement programs are not subject to  
constitutional and contractual restrictions;295 for example, many 
states limit amendments to public pension funds under State  
constitutions.296   
C.    Financial Priorities of Employees 
Opponents argue that employees not currently covered by 
employer-based retirement plans “may have other, more  
immediate savings priorities . . . [and that] [t]he policy rationale 
underlying the state initiatives does not give adequate  
consideration to the fact that retirement savings is not the  
beginning of the financial difficulties for many [workers].”297  
This Article contends that the opposition argument is  
disingenuous.  It is misguided to think that just because some 
employees have varied savings priorities, they should not be  
automatically enrolled in a workplace retirement savings  
program.  The important counterpoint to this argument is that 
these state programs contain an opt-out provision,298 so if an 
employee does not want to participate, they have no obligation to 
do so.   
Opponents also argue that the rule proposal will not solve 
the retirement crisis;299 however, the DOL proposed provision is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 100004; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/15; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.225. 
294 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 100002; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/20; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.200. 
295 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,467 (Aug. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
296 Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 
EDUC. FIN. AND POL’Y J. 617, 621 (2010). 
297 Blass Letter, supra note 265. 
298 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,1010 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
2510). 
299 Sanders Letter, supra note 265, at 1. 
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not meant to be a silver bullet.  Incredibly, one insurance trade  
association states that “[w]hile the proposed safe harbor could  
result in some increase in the percentage of people having an 
IRA (for some period of time), it would not help with investor 
education or better long-term planning.”300  This Article  
challenges this organization to explain why employees cannot 
have both because investment education and a state-mandated 
workplace retirement savings program should not be mutually 
exclusive. 
Opponents also argue that auto-enrollment is not in  
workers’ best interests.301  SIFMA argues that “data shows that 
while auto enrollment increases overall participation, it actually 
decreases the average savings rate.”302  Unfortunately, SIFMA, 
relying sources regarding a Wall Street Journal article instead of 
the actual study, only provides part of the story.303  First, the  
Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), the group who  
conducted the study, commented that “[t]he WSJ article reported 
only the most pessimistic setoff assumptions from EBRI  
research . . . [t]he WSJ also chose not to report any of the  
positive impacts of auto-enrollment 401(k)-type plans . . . [and] 
failed to mention . . . that it’s increasing savings for many 
more—especially the lowest-income 401(k) participants[.]”304  In 
its comment letter, SIFMA fails to mention that the study  
established that the measure increased the number of savers 
and savings rates for a number of smaller accounts.305  Second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Id. at 2. 
301 Bleier Letter, supra note 265, at 2. 
302 Id. at 4. 
303 Ann Tergesen, People tend to put more in their 401k if they do it voluntarily – 
Law Undercuts Retirement Savings, INVESTMENTWATCH (Jul. 7, 2011), 
http://investmentwatchblog.com/people-tend-to-put-more-in-their-401k-if-they-do-it-
voluntarily-law-undercuts-retirement-savings/ [https://perma.cc/AXA8-G6ZZ]; Bleier 
Letter, supra note 265, at 4. 
304 EBRI Comments on Wall Street Journal Article on 401(k) Auto-Enrollment, 
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Jul. 7, 2011), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/PR931.07July 
11.WSJ-Rsp.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH77-QVLP]. 
305 Jack VanDerhei & Lori Lucus, The Impact of Auto-enrollment and Automatic 
Contribution Escalation on Retirement Income Adequacy, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., 
NO. 349 (Nov. 10, 2010), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_011-
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even if SIFMA’s statement was factually accurate, as the great 
Wayne Gretsky once said, “‘[y]ou miss 100% of the shots you 
don’t take.’”306  An account with zero dollars will remain at zero, 
regardless of what the average savings rate is.   
SIFMA also contends that since “there is no [employer] 
match[,]” account growth will be limited.307  However, this  
argument is misplaced, as the state laws outlined in this paper 
will only affect employees of companies who do not currently  
offer a retirement plan308—there cannot be an employer match if 
the employer refuses to offer a retirement plan.  SIFMA also 
claims that “there is no monetary incentive to the employees to  
participate in the program.”309  However, they completely, and  
arguably, willfully ignore the benefits of depositing money  
pre-tax into an account that will earn compound interest over a 
number of years.   
D.    Financial Burden on Employers  
Opponents argue that employers would face increased costs 
with respect to state-run retirement plans;310 however, this  
Article contends that opponents’ claims are without merit.  First, 
the employers’ primary role under the state programs is limited 
to enrolling employees and sending their payroll deduction  
contributions to the IRA provider.311  A 2009 report by Optimal 
Benefit Strategies, LLC, on behalf of AARP, found that “97  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2010_No349_EBRI_DCIIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBX5-CS6D]. 
306 Paul B. Brown, ‘You Miss 100% Of The Shots You Don't Take.’ You Need To 
Start Shooting At Your Goals, FORBES (Jan. 12, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/actiontrumpseverything/2014/ 01/12/you-miss-100-of-the-
shots-you-dont-take-so-start-shooting-at-your-goal/#1014e9c45e42 [https://perma.cc/ 
ET3S-Y7AB]. 
307 Bleier Letter, supra note 265, at 4. 
308 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 100032; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.210. 
309 Bleier Letter, supra note 265, at 4. 
310 Id. at 2; Blass Letter, supra note 265. 
311 Most Small Employers Face Low Costs to Implement Automatic IRAs, 
OPTIMAL BENEFIT STRATEGIES, LLC (Aug. 19, 2009), http://assets.aarp.org/ 
rgcenter/econ/auto_iras.pdf [https://perma.cc/JX7K-45ZD]. 
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percent of employers with 10 or more employees use automated 
systems and do not process payroll manually.”312  This greatly  
decreases costs with respect to the payroll deposit retirement  
savings arrangements required by the state programs.   
Second, with respect to employer costs, the state-run  
retirement plans have a considerable cost advantage over  
existing payroll deduction IRA programs.313  Under the current 
private sector programs, employers must take time “to select a 
provider from [a variety of] options to establish a payroll  
deduction IRA program and to select investment options[.]”314  
The amount of time to do so costs money.  Under the state  
programs, “that cost to employers is not present . . . because the 
board chooses the provider, and the investment options are  
limited by statute.”315  Importantly, employers do not have to 
choose financial service providers or decide which investment 
options meet the needs of their employees.316 
Third, the DOL proposal specifically allows for employers to 
be reimbursed for “the actual costs of the program to the  
employer.”317  Importantly, all three programs require the state 
to pay for administrative costs, including those incurred by  
employers, until sufficient assets are available in the Programs 
to cover those costs.318  Accordingly, employers are reimbursed 
for any costs they incur when setting up the payroll system.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 Id. 
313 Spencer Cowan, What Types of Costs Would a State-Sponsored Retirement  
Savings Plan Impose on Employers: A Case Study Using the Illinois Secure Choice 
Savings Program, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 1, 4 (Dec. 2015), 
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2015/What-Types-Of-Costs-Would-A-State 
-Sponsored-Retirement-Plan-Impose-On-Employers.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT7S-
428X]. 
314 Id.  
315 Id. 
316 Id. 
317 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,1010 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
2510). 
318 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100004; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/16; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.225. 
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E.    Employer Liability 
Opponents argue that the state-run retirement plans would 
expose employers to potential liability under ERISA and the 
IRC.319  For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce argues 
that “there is a risk of increased legal liability for employers that 
the guidance does not address—an employee or class action suit 
could challenge the safe harbor definition under this proposal 
and claim that the employers are subject to ERISA.”320   
However, each state program has a clause stating that the  
program shall not be implemented if it is found to be an  
employee benefit plan under ERISA.321  Under the proposed safe 
harbor regulation, state-run retirement plans have a guide as to 
how to structure their plan to avoid ERISA liability.  Even 
though the courts still have the ultimate authority to decide if 
the state plan is governed by ERISA, courts should grant  
deference to the DOL regulation.   
Under each state law, employers will not be deemed  
fiduciaries under the Programs and are immunized from  
liability.322  As stated earlier in the Article, employers’ duties are 
limited to setting up their payroll system so that their employees 
can utilize the state-run retirement program.323             
F.    Portability of State Savings Accounts 
Opponents argue that individual state law could confuse  
employers and employees, and that “[d]ifferent states would  
likely have different rules governing operation, accumulation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Johnson & Wong Letter, supra note 95. 
320 Id. 
321 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100043; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/95; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.210. 
322 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100034; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/75; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.210. 
323 Payroll Deduction IRAs for Small Businesses, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.’S EMP. 
BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN. & THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-
center/publications/PayrollDeductionIRAs.pdf [https://perma.cc/96KL-J3KZ]. 
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and distributions[.]”324  This Article agrees with this concern.  
While the state laws discuss portability, none of the laws provide  
guidance on the issue.325  This concern is particularly acute at 
this point, since very few states have passed legislation for  
state-run retirement plans.326 
To remedy this problem, the state laws could, like the small 
business retirement marketplace in Washington state, work 
with IRA providers to establish a portal or marketplace that 
makes the rollover process simple and inexpensive.327  The 
states could also look to the federal MyRA program for guidance. 
G.    Contrary to Purpose of Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act 
Opponents argue that the state programs run contrary to 
the purpose of ERISA, which is to assure uniformity of the laws  
governing employee benefit plans.328  This is a legitimate  
concern.  However, from its inception, ERISA has provided  
multiple exemptions from its provisions.329  For example, ERISA 
does not apply to governmental plans “established or maintained 
for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the  
government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by 
any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.”330  
ERISA’s preemption provisions do not apply to state laws that 
regulate insurance, banking, or securities, or plans established 
solely to meet state workers’ compensation, unemployment  
compensation, or disability insurance laws.331   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Resource Center, supra note 276.  
325 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100034; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/75; OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.210. 
326 See Tom Anderson, More States to Offer Retirement Plans, CNBC (Aug. 26, 
2016, 12:55 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/19/california-set-to-join-states-
offering-retirement-plans.html [https://perma.cc/9EBS-AK36].  
327 See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.330.735 (2015). 
328 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,007 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
329 See 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (2012). 
330 Id. at § 1002(32).  
331 Id. at § 1144(b)(2). 
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The exemptions reflect that even though Congress intended 
ERISA to be a “comprehensive and reticulated statute,”332 
ERISA’s preemption provisions are not absolute.333  This Article 
contends that if Congress intended for ERISA to preempt all 
state laws, it would have written such a provision into the  
statute.  The absence of such a clause, while not determinative, 
provides evidence that Congress did not intend to foreclose all 
state action concerning employee benefit plans.334          
H.    Lack of Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
Protection 
Opponents argue that the state programs are not subject to 
ERISA’s fiduciary obligations under the state laws and that  
consumers are harmed by the lack of fiduciary protection.335  
This Article agrees with this concern; however, it is  
disingenuous that the same groups arguing that consumers need 
ERISA fiduciary protection are the same groups fighting a 
broadened ERISA fiduciary duty under the DOL’s proposed  
conflict of interest rulemaking.336  It is important to note that 
the state programs discussed in this Article all have a required 
standard of conduct similar to the fiduciary standard under 
ERISA.337   
Under the California Program, all members of the  
California Board are required to discharge their duties “solely in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 361 (1984). 
333 David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in  
Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT L. REV. 427, 452 (1987). 
334 Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (“Where Congress 
explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional  
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative 
intent.” (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. U.S., 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942))). 
335 Sanders Letter, supra note 265, at 3; Blass Letter, supra note 265; Bleier  
Letter, supra note 265, at 4. 
336 Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement  
Investment Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,928 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pts. 2509 and 2510). 
337 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100034; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25; OR. REV. STAT. § 
557.2; 29 U.S.C. § 1104. 
NELSONFINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   1/25/17    2:56  PM  
2016]     SAFE HARBOR FOR STATE SAVINGS PROGRAMS 127 
the interest” of the California Program participants.338  This  
includes an exclusive purpose test, where the board member 
must act “[f]or the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to 
program participants and defraying reasonable expenses of  
administering the program,”339 and a prudent person test, where 
the board members must invest “with the care, skill, prudence, 
and diligence under the prevailing circumstances a prudent  
person acting in a like capacity and familiar with those matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and 
with like aims[.]”340  Members of the Illinois Board are required 
to discharge their duties under a fiduciary standard of  
conduct.341  This includes an exclusive purpose test, where the 
board member must act “for the exclusive purposes of providing 
benefits to [program participants] and defraying reasonable  
expenses of administering the Program”342 and a prudent person 
test, where the board members must invest “with the care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing 
that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with 
those matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like  
character and with like aims.”343  Members of the Oregon Board 
are required to discharge their duties under a prudent person 
test, where the board members must “exercise the judgment and 
care then prevailing that persons of prudence, discretion and  
intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs with 
due regard to the probable income and level of risk from certain 
types of investments of money.”344         
This Article, as discussed below, contends that the DOL rule 
proposal should be revised to mandate that each state  
implement an enforceable fiduciary standard as part of its  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(d).  
339 Id. 
340 Id. 
341 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25.  
342 Id. 
343 Id. 
344 OR. REV. STAT. § 557.2.  
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retirement savings program.345  This requirement will allay any 
fear that consumers will not be afforded fiduciary-level  
protection under a state-run retirement savings plan, and  
minimize the fears of industry groups of a non-level playing field 
benefitting state-run retirement savings programs.346   
I.    Implications of Proposed Rulemaking on U.S. 
Trade Obligations  
Opponents argue that “[e]xempting state-sponsored plans 
for private sector employees from ERISA requirements could . . . 
raise concerns regarding U.S. obligations to trading partners.”347  
This Article contends that this argument is not legally  
supported.  For example, ACLI cites to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).348  However, NAFTA states that its  
provisions shall not “be construed to prevent a Party, including 
its public entities, from exclusively conducting or providing in its 
territory: (a) activities or services forming part of a public  
retirement plan or statutory system of social security[.]”349   
Additionally, NAFTA states that none of its provisions “shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining  
reasonable measures for prudential reasons, such as: (a) the  
protection of investors, depositors, financial market participants, 
policy-holders, policy-claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary 
duty is owed by a financial institution or cross-border financial 
service provider[.]”350   
ACLI also cites the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(Agreement); however, the Agreement states that the provisions 
of the Agreement do “not apply to measures adopted or  
maintained by a Party relating to: (a) activities or services  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 See discussion infra Part VII.B. 
346 Sanders Letter, supra note 265, at 4. 
347 Szostek & Bard Letter, supra note 265, at 5. 
348 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
349 Id. at 657. 
350 Id. at 659. 
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forming part of a public retirement plan or statutory system of 
social security[.]”351  The Agreement also states that “a Party 
shall not be prevented from adopting or maintaining measures 
for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors,  
depositors, policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is 
owed by a financial institution or cross-border financial service 
supplier[.]”352  Since these Agreements seem to exempt public  
retirement plans and laws to ensure financial stability and  
protect investors,353 this opposition argument is not legally  
supported and, therefore, should be disregarded.    
VII.  COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF LABOR RULE PROPOSAL 
A.    Require Non-Binding Verification of State 
Programs 
The DOL should affirmatively state whether a state  
program is consistent with the DOL rule proposal.  While the 
court will be the ultimate arbiter of whether a state program is 
subject to ERISA, the court will grant deference to the DOL’s  
determination.354  This determination would alleviate opposition 
concerns regarding employer liability for failing to meet the DOL 
proposed safe harbor and as well as concerns of states that want 
to implement state-run retirement savings programs.  While  
parties currently can submit requests for interpretations and 
other rulings on regulations from the DOL Office of Regulations 
and Interpretations under the provisions established by ERISA 
Procedure 76-1,355 this Article suggests that the DOL should  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States 
of America, U.S.-S. Kor. 13-1, Jun. 30, 2007, modified Dec. 5, 2010, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file35_
12712.pdf [https://perma.cc/36DB-5RYC]. 
352 Id. at 13-5. 
353 See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 348; Free Trade 
Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, supra 
note 351 . 
354 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
355 Filing Requests For ERISA Advisory Opinions, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/aos/ao_requests.html [https://perma.cc/UW53-4LDJ].  
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provide an advisory opinion automatically, without the need for 
such a request.  
B.    Require Enforceable Fiduciary Duty 
The DOL rule proposal should mandate each state to  
implement an enforceable fiduciary standard as part of its  
retirement savings program.  While each state law discussed in 
this Article either has an explicit fiduciary standard or has a  
written standard of conduct similar to the fiduciary standard,356 
the proposed rulemaking does not require a state law to include 
a fiduciary obligation.357  The DOL could use the Illinois  
Program as a model, where members of the Illinois Board are 
required to discharge their duties under a fiduciary standard of 
conduct.358  Importantly, the fiduciary duty imposed by the  
Illinois Program is similar to the fiduciary duty under ERISA.359  
The Illinois Program requires the Illinois Board to discharge its 
duties solely in the interest of the employees and for the  
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to those employees.360  
The definition also includes the prudent person standard, which 
has been an essential criterion of the ERISA fiduciary duty since 
its enactment.361     
This requirement will allay any fear that consumers will not 
be provided fiduciary-level protection under a state retirement 
savings plan, as well as minimize the fears of industry groups of 
a non-level playing field benefitting state-run retirement savings 
programs. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100034; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25; OR. REV. STAT. § 
557.2. 
357 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
358 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25. 
359 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (fiduciary duty), with 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25.  
360 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25. 
361 See Rosemary B. Orr, Fiduciary Standards as Applied Under ERISA, 7 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 377, 385-86 (1979). 
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C.    Require Reporting and Review of State Payroll 
Deduction Savings Programs  
The DOL should require an annual audit on the operations 
of the state payroll deduction savings program.  The DOL should 
also mandate that all audits and reports published by the state 
entities shall use the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) Accounting Standards.362  States may argue that they 
should be able to rely on Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB) Accounting Standards,363 which govern the  
standards of accounting and financial reporting for U.S. state 
and local governments.364  States will argue that “[a]ccounting 
and financial reporting standards designed for the government  
environment are essential because governments are  
fundamentally different from for-profit businesses.”365  However, 
while these payroll deduction programs are state-run, the  
programs cover private-sector employees366 and, therefore, 
should be treated as such.   
In addition to the annual financial audit, the state entity 
should provide a comprehensive inventory of the program  
including, but not limited to, the number of participants enrolled 
in the program both at the beginning and end of the fiscal year, 
retired or separated participants receiving benefits, and  
deceased participants whose beneficiaries are receiving or are 
entitled to receive benefits.367  The state law should also require 
a full study of the payroll deduction savings program at regular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Standards, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/ 
jsp/FASB/Page/LandingPage&cid=1175805317350 [https://perma.cc/6UMQ-F9Y5]  
363 Standards & Guidance, GOV’T ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, 
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBLandingPage&cid=1176160042327 
[https://perma.cc/B2M2-KS6M]. 
364 Facts About GASB 2015-2016, GOV’T ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD 1, 2, 
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage&cid=11761661600
26 [https://perma.cc/T26U-NGKR]. 
365 Id. 
366 Anderson, supra note 326.  
367 IRS Form 5500, ANN. RETURN/REPORT OF EMP. BENEFIT PLAN, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2015-5500.pdf [https://perma.cc/HTE9-TKLV] (The  
author used this form as a guide). 
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intervals of at least every three years.  
D.    Allow Reliance on Existing Wage and Employment 
Laws 
The DOL proposal should not require a state to add special 
enforcement mechanisms or other mechanisms to protect  
workers enrolled in its payroll deduction savings program, if the 
state determines that its existing wage and employment laws  
offer adequate protection.  California, Illinois, and Oregon each 
have “wage-hour” laws and an enforcement system to protect  
employees against employers’ failure to properly withhold from 
their paychecks and apply those withholdings as required by 
law.368     
This Article recommends that the DOL require states to  
incorporate by reference these wage and employment laws,369 so 
that the protection will be explicit and meet the standard under 
the proposed rulemaking.  
E.    Allow Employers to Provide General Information 
to Employees  
The DOL should provide guidance on the ability of  
employers to provide general information about state-run  
programs to participants.  Under the proposed rule, an  
employer’s involvement is limited to “[d]istributing program  
information to employees from the State[.]”370  Under the current 
language, an employer would risk violating the safe harbor  
provisions by answering an employee’s questions concerning the 
program.371  The DOL should allow employers to provide basic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 79 et seq.; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/1 et seq.; OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 652 et seq. 
369 At the Federal level, incorporation by reference allows agencies to comply 
with the requirement of publishing rules in the Federal Register to be codified in the 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) by referring to material published elsewhere.  
The same can be done at the state level. 
370 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
371 Id. 
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information concerning the program; however, the information 
should be limited to how the program works.  Employers should 
receive guidance on where to direct questions about the program 
that are outside the safe harbor provisions, i.e., how are the  
employee’s funds invested or how the employee can contribute 
more to his or her account.   
To assist employers, the DOL should mandate that the state 
program create an office of ombudsperson, independent of the 
state entity overseeing the program, to address concerns of  
participants when they arise.  The state program should allocate 
sufficient funds to sustain the operation of the ombudsperson’s 
office and hire additional staff when necessary.  The DOL should 
also require the creation of a website that addresses common 
questions with respect to the program, provides information to 
participants and houses documents created by the state entity 
that participants can access and print.         
F.    Provide Guidance on Withdrawals and Portability 
of Savings Accounts 
The DOL should provide guidance on how withdrawals are 
treated under the proposed rule.  Under the current language, 
the rule prohibits the state from imposing “any restrictions on  
withdrawals or impos[ing] any cost or penalty on transfers or  
rollovers permitted under the Internal Revenue Code[.]372   
However, a state may want to include products with lifetime  
income features.373  Additionally, the state may wish to restrict 
the frequency and timing of withdrawals to reduce “leakage.”374 
The states’ goal is to increase the retirement savings of its  
citizens; however, if the money is withdrawn for non-retirement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 Id. 
373 Mark Schoeff Jr., Treasury, IRS OK Annuities in 401(k) Target Date Funds, 
INVESTMENTNEWS (Oct. 24, 10:26 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/ 
20141024/FREE/141029947/treasury-irs-ok-annuities-in-401-k-target-date-funds 
[https://perma.cc/3TVB-37QC]. 
374 Reducing Retirement Savings Leakage, 37 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1, 2 (Aug. 
2016), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_07-no9-Aug16.PolFor-Ret.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G6M7-UKRH].  
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uses, it defeats this purpose. 
One commenter to the proposed rule suggests that the DOL 
allow states to incorporate the “hardship withdrawal” rule from 
the IRC.375  This provision allows retirement savers to withdraw 
money from a 401(k) account for certain expense including  
un-reimbursed medical expenses; money toward the purchase of 
a principal residence; to prevent foreclosure or eviction from a  
principal residence; college tuition and related educational  
expenses; funeral expenses; and certain expenses for the repair 
of damage to a principal residence.376  This provision would  
allow retirement savers to access savings for emergencies, but 
would protect retirement savings from other withdrawals.377 
The DOL should also provide guidance on how distributions 
will be treated under the proposed rule.  Both critics and  
supporters of the rule are concerned that the rule does not  
consider employees that move to different states.378  One  
commenter to the proposed rule suggests that States be able to 
enter into “partnerships with other states to create automatic-
payroll deduction IRAs[.]”379  Additionally, the DOL should  
explicitly state that retirement savers can keep the same  
account when they change employers and can roll the balance 
into a private sector retirement account at any time. 
G.    Clarify Scope of Employers Covered 
The DOL should clarify the scope of employers covered by 
the proposed rule.  Under the current language, the rule states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Letter from William Griesser, Senior Managing Director, TIAA-CREF, to  
Office of Regulations and Interpretations, Emp. Benefit Sec. Admin., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LAB. (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-
regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00044.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QBC5-NEFV]. 
376 Retirement Plans FAQs Regarding Hardship Distributions, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plans-FAQs-
regarding-Hardship-Distributions [https://perma.cc/K38N-SZVD]. 
377 Id. 
378 Blass Letter, supra note 265, at 3; Bleier Letter, supra note 265, at 5. 
379 Stein Letter, supra note 266, at 6.  
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that a state law will meet the requirements of the safe harbor if 
an “employer’s participation in the program is required by State 
law[.]”380  However, states provide exemptions based on size of 
the company; for example, the California Program exempts  
employers with less than five employees381 and Illinois exempts 
employers with less than twenty-five employees.382   
This Article agrees with the Pension Rights Center and  
argues that the DOL should provide a hardship exemption that 
would provide states with the flexibility to determine which  
employers may be exempt from the mandatory adoption  
requirement.383  The proposed rule should permit a state to  
mandate adoption by all employers but permit smaller  
employers to apply for a hardship exemption from the mandate.     
H.    Clarify States’ Ability to Delegate Responsibility   
The DOL should clarify that states can delegate  
responsibility and rely on third-party vendors for investment 
management and record-keeping.  Under the current language, 
the proposed rule requires states to establish and administer the 
programs, and holds states responsible for investing employee 
savings and selecting investment alternatives for employees to 
choose.384  While the proposed rule allows states to rely on  
service providers, the state still “retains full responsibility for 
the operation and administration of the program[.]”385  
The DOL should clarify that this provision will not absolve 
third-party vendors from liability for their actions.  The states, 
when retaining service providers, have the responsibility to  
monitor those providers and replace them if necessary.386  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
381 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 100000(d). 
382 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/5. 
383 Stein Letter, supra note 266, at 4. 
384 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,014. 
385 Id.  
386 Id. 
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I.    Clarify Allowable Compensation to Employers 
The DOL should clarify the compensation provision under 
the proposed rule.  Under the current language, the rule  
prohibits the employer from receiving direct or indirect  
compensation other than the actual costs of the state program.387  
The proposed rule should be amended to exempt tax benefits 
that the state provides to employers, since this compensation 
will not be provided to reimburse the employer for actual costs of 
the state program.388  This Article contends that the DOL did 
not intend to strip employers of these tax benefits by mandating 
participation in state payroll deduction savings programs.      
VIII.  ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF A MODEL STATE PAYROLL 
DEDUCTION SAVINGS PROGRAM  
This Article has discussed, in detail, three current state  
initiatives to require private sector employers to implement 
state-administered payroll deduction savings programs in their  
workplaces and suggests that the DOL improve its proposed 
rulemaking.389  This Section of the article provides additional  
elements of a model state payroll deduction savings program for 
states that are considering implementing such a program to use 
as a guide.   
A.    Provide Lifetime Income Distribution Options 
The state program should provide a lifetime income  
distribution option to participants.  This Article, relying on an 
AARP Public Policy Institute whitepaper,390 will put forth three 
options: an “immediate annuity at retirement, . . . [a] [l]ongevity 
annuity at retirement[,] . . . [and] [a] target date fund (TDF) that 
includes the gradual purchase of an annuity during an  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 Id. 
388 Id. 
389 See discussion supra Parts IV.-V. 
390 Kahn & Strakosch, supra note 266, at 4. 
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individual’s working lifetime.”391   The first option, an immediate 
annuity at retirement, would allow “participants [to] use a  
portion of their assets to create a guaranteed lifetime income 
stream by purchasing an annuity that begins income payments 
within the first twelve months after buying the annuity.”392  The 
second option, a longevity annuity at retirement, “is a deferred 
fixed-income annuity purchased at retirement or earlier that  
begins to make payments at a much later date, typically 
[around] age 80 or 85.”393  The third option, a target date fund 
(TDF) that includes the gradual purchase of an annuity, would 
convert a portion of the TDF on an annual basis “into an annuity 
so that by retirement, a preset proportion of the total is available 
as guaranteed lifetime income.”394  The state program should 
make all of these options available to the participants so that 
they may choose which option best suits their needs.     
B.    Spousal Protection 
The state program should require the spouse or domestic 
partner to be the default beneficiary on the account, unless the 
spouse or partner waives those protections.  This is vitally  
important because retirement savings is generally a family  
affair, where the spouse or partner has a significant interest in 
the outcome.395  It is important to note that this will not be an  
absolute guarantee, as there could be legitimate reasons why the 
employee would decide that the spouse or domestic partner 
should not be a beneficiary of the account.  The law should also 
mandate that the program establish an administrative process 
for dividing program assets in a divorce, consistent with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Id. at 2. 
392 Id. 
393 Id. 
394 Id. 
395 See Shelly Lundberg & Jennifer Ward-Batts, Saving for Retirement:  
Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth 3 (U. of Mich. Ret. Res. Ctr.  
Working Paper, Paper No. 2000-004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=532822 
[https://perma.cc/ZUJ6-PFQQ]. 
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state’s laws on martial property.   
C.    Increased Default Contribution Rate 
The state program should set the default contribution rate 
at five percent or higher.  Many private retirement plans follow  
federal legislation and use a contribution level of three percent 
of earnings.396  However, studies have found that this level is not 
enough to create retirement balances sufficient to replace  
pre-retirement earnings.397  Additionally, studies reflect that 
even though the average automatic enrollment deferral is 
around four percent, employees opt out at virtually the same 
rate when the deferral is higher.398 
IX.  CONCLUSION        
There is a “retirement crisis” in America.399  Contributing to 
this crisis is the fact that millions of Americans do not have  
access to a retirement savings plan through their employers.400  
States, concerned with the economic stability of their citizens, 
have created laws that require private sector employers to  
implement state-administered payroll deduction savings  
programs in their workplaces.401  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Jack VanDerhei, Auto-IRAs: How Much Would They Increase the Probability 
of “Successful” Retirements and Decrease Retirement Deficits? Preliminary Evidence 
from EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model,® 36 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1, 
11-12 (June 2015), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_06_June15_SI-
AutoIRAs.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TVU-FYKD]. 
397 Id. at 16 (“doubling the employee contribution rate (from 3 to 6 percent) for 
the auto-IRA increases the improvement in the RRR [defined as the probability of a  
“successful” retirement] values by approximately 81 percent (from an 8.4 percent  
increase to a 15.2 percent increase) for those in the youngest cohort and working for 
the smallest employers.”). 
398 Mark Robinson, Success of Auto Enrollment and Auto Increase:  
Using Behavioral Finance to Improve Retirement Planning, T.ROWEPRICE, 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/programs/policyforums/Robinson0510PF.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J4MX-ZCP8]. 
399 See Rhee, supra note 1.   
400 See Who’s In, Who’s Out, supra note 4. 
401 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental  
Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,007 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
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This Article demonstrated that while there are legitimate 
policy concerns with respect to state-administered payroll  
deduction savings programs, opponents continue to make  
unfounded and misleading arguments against state laws  
intended to increase their citizens’ retirement savings.  This  
Article provided several comments on the proposed rulemaking 
that will provide more flexibility for states when designing state 
payroll deduction savings programs without sacrificing the level 
of investor protection.  This Article applauds the DOL for  
providing guidance to allow states to institute  
state-administered payroll deduction savings programs that will 
offer benefits to millions of workers across the country.  
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